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PALESTINIAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND ISRAEL

by

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June 2000

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PALESTINIAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND ISRAEL

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines political violence by Palestinian groups against Israel and endeavors to determine if this political violence was a necessary component of Israel's decision to agree to the Oslo Accords and subsequent peace process initiative. Through the analysis of four separate time periods in Palestinian history (1948 to The Six Day War, The Six Day War to the *Intifada*, the *Intifada* to the Oslo Accords, and post-Oslo Accords) it was shown that three separate forms of political violence were used (guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and civil unrest). When one form of political violence was ended another formed.. Being a democracy, Israel required strong internal support for peace to bring about the peace process. This internal support was created by a demand for personal security and is seen in the creation of new political parties and movements. In short: this thesis demonstrates through argument and evidence that Israel is engaged in a land for security peace deal with the Palestinians primarily because the Palestinians had engaged in political violence.

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*Blessed are you, Hashem, our God, King of the universe,
Who is good and does good...
Who has given of His knowledge to human beings...
Who has apportioned of His knowledge to those who fear Him.*

UNITED STATES

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and the Aish Ha Torah Organization

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HISTORICAL RELEVANCE

This thesis examines political violence by Palestinian groups against Israel and endeavors to determine if this political violence was a necessary component of Israel's decision to agree to the Oslo accords and subsequent peace process initiative. Though Israel was experiencing great external pressure to come to an understanding with the Palestinians it would not have been enough to force Israel to make a deal. Even today US as well as European Union pressure are not enough to compel Israel to complete the "land for security" deal without the appropriate security guarantees being offered by the Palestinian Authority. Being a democracy, Israel required strong internal support for peace to bring about the peace process. This internal support was created by a demand for personal security and is seen in the creation of new political parties and movements. Security could only come about by ending random violent acts by Palestinian groups, and this could only be achieved by negotiating a peace with the Palestinians. In short: I will demonstrate in this thesis that Israel is engaged in a "land for security" peace deal with the Palestinians primarily because the Palestinians had engaged in political violence.

Political violence conducted by Palestinians against Israel has been a Middle East reality since the recreation of the Jewish State in 1948. The expulsion of the Palestinian people from historic Palestine at that time is the root of the conflict. Palestinian acts of political violence have had a dramatic and lasting effect on the policies pursued by Israeli political and military elite, foreign governments' policies with

regards to Israel, the Palestinians and Arab nations, and the psyches of the Israeli and Palestinian populaces.

Between the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars political violence conducted by the Palestinians can best be described as a Palestinian guerrilla war. A guerrilla war is motivated by a belief that the state can be defeated by violent means. Targets are chosen to support the military conquest by the guerrilla leaders and will thus tend to be military and political targets instead of noncombatants. A guerrilla war is not waged to get a reaction from a “target audience,” though the actors would hope to encourage support; the goal is a military victory. In the Palestinian case, the guerrilla war was a partisan-style guerrilla war with exogenous support coming from several Arab nations, primarily Egypt.

This guerrilla war can be described clearly in two phases. The first phase consisted of almost total control of Palestinian forces by Arab nations that culminated in the 1956 Arab-Israeli war. The second phase was the period between the 1956 Arab-Israeli war and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In this phase, Palestinian organizations were created, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Al-Fatah, to develop policy and coordinate actions including actions of political violence. An outcome of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war was a complete elimination of the capacity and will of the Arab nations to continue the Palestinian guerrilla conflict. Geographical changes, specifically the occupation of the Sinai, the Golan, Gaza, and the West Bank, as well as lack of sponsors ended the Palestinian guerrilla war.

President Nasser of Egypt initiated the creation in 1964 of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO soon grew to be an umbrella organization that was made-up of several of the most important Palestinian organizations already operating. It was Nasser's intent to have a tool that could influence Israeli policy through rhetoric and limited political violence without involving Egypt in another major war with Israel. Nasser's and Egypt's control of the PLO was short lived. Even before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Al-Fatah, a prominent Palestinian organization lead by Yasser Arafat had emerged as the primary influence on the PLO. In 1969, after the calamitous Arab defeat in the recent war and subsequent decline of Nasser's influence, Arafat became chairman of the PLO.

In the 1970's and 1980's the focus of Palestinian political violence changed from a guerrilla conflict to a terrorist struggle. The US State Department defines terrorism as the:

“...premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”¹

The key concepts of a terrorist action are that it is politically motivated, its target is noncombatants (i.e. civilians, soldiers on liberty or leave, etc.), and it is intended to get a reaction from an audience.

The rise of organizations expert in covert operations and fueled by political ideology brought about two decades of Palestinian terrorism. Beginning in 1973, the

¹ “Patterns of Global Terrorism Report.”
[<http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1996Report/>]. 1996.

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), committed to the “armed struggle against the Zionist enemy,”² commenced its campaign. The ANO was made infamous by assassinations, hijackings, and suicide bombings. Al-Fatah and associated units such as Al-Assifa, the Black Panthers, Fatah Hawks, and Force 17, also continued political violence, now terrorism, against Israelis, Jews, and other targets designed to bring attention to the Palestinian plight. An alleged sub-group of Al-Fatah, Black September, in 1972 was responsible for the killing of 11 Israeli Olympic athletes and staff in Munich. Other groups such as Dr. George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), both Marxist-Leninist in ideology, conducted random attacks on Israel, Israel’s allies, Jews, and occasionally intra-Palestinian targets, to bring attention to the Palestinian people’s condition or on occasion simply for revenge. Israel responded to Palestinian terrorism with covert operations including assassinations and overt operations such as bombing PLO headquarters in Tunis and invading Lebanon.

In the late 1980’s, there was a dramatic change in the type and motivation of political violence conducted by Palestinians against Israel. In December 1987, a spontaneous uprising occurred at Jabaliya, a Gaza refugee camp. This uprising, called the *Intifada* or shaking-off, consisted of much low intensity political violence of rock and Molotov cocktail throwing. Unlike many of the earlier attacks, the organizations committing political violence during the *Intifada* did not enjoy significant aid from a foreign government nor strong local organizational control. They were loosely organized

² Builta, J. A., *Extremist Groups*, p. 726, Office of International Criminal Justice, 1996.

and the motivation behind the attacks was perhaps more frustration at both the PLO and Israel than political ideology. This frustration also manifested itself in another form of violence against Israel that was to come to its apex after the start of the *Intifada*. Organizations committed to political-religious ideology, Islamist, emerged. By far, the most popular, influential and powerful of these Islamism groups in the occupied territories is Hamas.

The rise of a new form of political violence in the *Intifada* combined with the years of Palestinian political violence, convinced the Israeli State that the only solution to political violence was a land for security deal. Moreover, the weakness and diminishing resources of the PLO as demonstrated by the rise of other organizations like Hamas, made the land for security deal not only acceptable but near imperative for the organization's survival. Finally, The recent coalition success of the Gulf War placed the United States in a position to be an *honest broker* as well as regional influence in the peace for security deal.

Of particular concern in this thesis will be the ability of Palestinian political violence to adapt over time to Israeli actions, why these different forms of political violence were employed at different times and the linkage or transition between the various forms. It will be argued that one form of political violence alone would not have been enough to drive the Government of Israel to a land for security deal. Over the years Israel devised effective responses to each form of political violence, only to be met with a new form of violence. With time, the government of Israel come to realize that its security could only be guaranteed if the root causes of the Palestinian problem (the lack of land) and not just its symptom (political violence) were addressed.

For half a century, Palestinian groups had engaged in political violence against Israel. Israel has been neither acquiescent nor complacent. The Israeli reaction to these attacks has been Hammurabin (i.e. “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”) in the near term, while the policy makers attempted to develop a strategy that would ensure security for the state and the population for the future. The long-term strategy adopted culminated in the commencement of the peace process.

Israel’s Hammurabin actions have been to respond quickly to terrorist attacks by destroying Palestinian hoses of individuals involved even remotely in the attack. In addition, Israel has used rockets, artillery and other weapons of conventional warfare to respond to low-level political violence. Regardless of the level or repetition of Israel’s violent militant responses, it failed to end Palestinian political violence. This was most evident to the population of Israel by the Government of Israel’s inability to contain the political violence of the *Intifada*.

The government and people of Israel were very much aware of the failure of their containment policy with regards to Palestinian political violence. With the failure of the various Hammurabin responses, Israel sought an alternative solution. The solution the Israeli Government has chosen to pursue is negotiation with these Palestinians who are willing to compromise in a land for security peace process. Today, Israel is expecting and the Palestinians are promising that peace will come with the advent of a founding (or perhaps refounding)³ of the state of Palestine.

³ Palestine (*Greek: Palaistina*, derivative of *Hebrew: Pleshet, Land of Philistines*) was under Islamic (Arab) suzerainty from 637-1072 CE, 1092-1099 CE, and (Ottoman/Turkish) 1187-1517 CE.

B. DEFINITIONS OF CRITICAL TERMS

The political terms used in this thesis to describe political violence are often used in common parlance generally implying a normative distinction. For example, “terrorist” is usually associated with a negative connotation while “guerrilla” is usually associated with a more neutral connotation and “freedom fighter” is often associated with a positive connotation. In this thesis, the terms resistance, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare are used not to distinguish between various connotations, rather they are used to distinguish between the size, level of organization, and goal orientation of the actors and groups engaged in political violence.

First, what is meant by political violence? Political violence refers to the collective attacks within a polity, committed by indigenous or exogenous groups or individuals, against the government, its political elite, or its policies.

Paul Wilkinson, department head of Politics and International Relation at the University of Aberdeen, takes an in-depth look at the various forms of political violence in his book *Terrorism & the Liberal State*.

Table 1 is Wilkinson’s typology of political violence based on the general political purposes or aims that political violence may serve. The three types based on Wilkinson’s categorizing in which the Palestinians most often engaged were: war (limited), terroristic, and resistance.

Type	General aims or purposes
1. Inter-communal	Defence or furtherance of alleged group interests in conflicts with rival ethnic or religious groups
2. Remonstrative	Expression of anger and protest: can be used to persuade government to remedy grievances
3. Praetorian	Used to coerce changes in government leadership and policy
4. Repression	Quelling actual or potential opposition and dissent
5. Resistance	To oppose and prevent a government establishing authority and executing its laws
6. Terroristic	Use of systematic murder and destruction, or threats of murder and destruction to terrorise targets or victims into conceding the terrorists' political aims
7. Revolutionary	Overthrow of existing political system and its replacement by a new régime: note that leaders of this type of violence are often prepared to exploit all types of political violence, including war
8. Counter-revolutionary	
9. War	To gain political ends by means of military victory over opponents

Table 1. Types of political violence classified by aims or purposes⁴

Palestinian political violence was manifested as a war in the period from the 1948 Arab-Israeli war to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. During this period, Palestinian leaders guided by other Arab leaders believed that their political ends could be achieved through direct military means.

As Wilkinson's definition suggests, a guerrilla war is motivated by a belief that the state can be defeated by violent military means. Targets are chosen to support the military conquest by the guerrilla leaders and will thus tend to be military and political

⁴ P. Wilkinson, *Terrorism & the Liberal State*, p. 33, New York University Press, 1986.

targets in stead of noncombatants. A guerrilla war is not waged to get a reaction from an audience; though the actors would hope to encourage support, the goal is a military victory.

After the Arab loss in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Palestinian groups engaged in the political violence of terrorism as Wilkinson defines it. That is, Palestinian groups engaged in systematic murder and distraction as well as the threatened use of it in seeking political aims from targets. However, Wilkinson's definition lacks the U.S. State department's "third party targeted audience" concept. This concept is critical in understanding how Palestinian groups chose victims. To put it another way, the target and the victim of a terrorist attack are not the same. The victim is the individual or group upon which the political violence is undertaken. The target is the individual or group that is expected to have a political reaction, such as a policy change, because of the attack.

The forces that provide the motivation for a group to commit terrorist actions or to engage in a guerrilla war are mostly external to the group engaged in the violent acts. The obvious criteria would be the possibility of victory. With the possibility of a military victory being unattainable, committing terrorist acts to aid in order to force a desired political outcome would be a rational decision. With the possibility of a military victory a reality, a guerrilla war and subsequent struggle for the state would be the likely chosen course of action. Thus, a strong center will encourage terrorism; a weak center will encourage a guerrilla war by those who engage in political violence.

In the late 1980's, acts of Palestinian terrorism diminished and a resistance movement grew. In concurrence with Wilkinson's definition, this movement was in

opposition to the Government of Israel executing its laws in the territories in which this resistance movement thrived.

These three specific categories of political violence, war, terrorism, and resistance, can broadly be placed in the three forms of political violence as described by Ted Robert Gurr in *Why Men Rebel*:

1. Turmoil: Relatively spontaneous, unorganized political violence with substantial popular participation, including violent political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localized rebellions.
2. Conspiracy: Highly organized political violence with limited participation, including organized political assassinations, small-scale terrorism, small-scale guerrilla wars, coups d'etat, and mutinies.
3. Internal war: Highly organized political violence with wide-spread popular participation, designed to over-throw the regime or dissolve the state and accompanied by extensive violence, including large-scale terrorism and guerrilla wars, civil wars, and revolutions.⁵

By looking at Gurr's list, one could quickly conclude that resistance is a form of turmoil, that terrorism is a form of conspiracy and that a guerrilla war is a form of internal war. It is not by coincident that the three types of political violence in which Palestinian groups engaged -- resistance, terrorism, and war -- fit conveniently into Gurr's three forms of political violence of turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war, respectfully. It is exactly what ought to have been expected.

Palestinian groups attempted one *type* of political violence from the first *form* of political violence and when that failed in achieving the desired aims they tried a type from the second form and when that failed a type from the third form was attempted. This was the conundrum that Israel faced. When the Israelis succeeded in defeating one

⁵ Gurr, T. R., *Why Men Rebel*, p. 11, Princeton University Press, 1971.

form of Palestinian political violence they were soon found facing another. Each form of political violence requires deferent policies and procedures to combat it. Palestinian resilience forced Israel to run short of traditional military, covert, and constabulary options. The land for security deal was by the 1990's perceived as the only way to terminate all three forms of Palestinian political violence.

C. ISRAEL'S DESIRE FOR SECURITY: COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY AND REALISM THEORY

United Nations Resolution 242 is seeking a "just and lasting peace" and is calling upon Israel to withdraw from territories recently occupied. So, how is it understood that the a land for peace deal is synonymies for a land for security deal. To the average Israeli peace and real security are one and the same. This is not just an Israeli concept, it is a concept in Judaism as old as the word *shalom*. Shalom means peace but it also conveys the ideas of stability, security, and lack of violent conflict.

This concept is also revealed in modern political science theory. To the realists, peace is obtained through security. That is to say, through military strength and readiness. Peace is viewed as only the time period between wars and as such security can postpones the inevitable. To the complex interdependence theorists war is an event that happens in-between times of peace and as such peace is not security, peace is a precondition for security. Once peace is obtained, the complex interdependence theorists argues that other factors contribute to security such as NGO's interaction and transnational economic development.

In the world of international relations for Israel and in fact all nation states, the policy makers choose to pursue are greatly influence by the school of thought that underlies their government's foreign policy. The two most common schools used today are *complex interdependence theory* and *realism theory*.

Complex interdependence theory is the modern evolved descendant of the 19th century's *classic liberalism*. The classic liberalism school was founded in the belief that "capitalist states tend to be peaceful because war is bad for business"⁶ or as Richard Cobden, a British liberal of the 1840's said, "we can keep the world from actual war, and I trust that the world will do that through trade."⁷ Classic liberalism suffered a minor setback in 1914 when all the world's major capitalistic countries engaged in Word War I.

The modern revised liberal school is complex interdependence theory. This school is based in liberalism; yet, it borrows much from modern realism. The key assumptions of complex interdependence are: "(1) States are not the only significant actors – transnational actors working across state boundaries are also major actors; (2) force is not the only significant instrument – economic manipulation and the use of international institutions are the dominant instrument; (3) security is not the dominant goal – welfare is the dominant goal."⁸ This theory as a tool has been useful in understanding and making predictions in the relations between some countries particularly the United States vis-a-vis western-style democracies. However, complex

⁶ Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflict*, p. 36, Harvard University, 1997.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

interdependence fails as a predictor when security, not welfare, remains the primary strategic goal of a state. In this case realism theory has proven to be the best model.

Realists assume that the state is the only significant actor. In addition, it is accepted that these states are making international relations decisions in a rational manner in attempting to achieve their goals. Moreover, the international system in which these states are the actors is an anarchic system. That is, it is a system with no international organization with any significant influence over the various states. This, of course, is the base for realism's doctrine that the individual state is solely responsible for its own survival and, as such, military force is the dominant instrument of both foreign policy and national security. Israel has demonstrated time and again over the last 50 years that realism is the theory most prevalent in its foreign policy. The Israeli primacy on security and their deliberate disregard for UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (see appendix) are some examples of how realism is the dominant theory in practice over complex interdependence.

Israel's reliance on realism as the basis of their foreign policy suggests that they would react to a threat to their security with force. This was often the case. In 1986 and 1987, Force 17, the Praetorian Guard for Arafat and a sub-group of Fatah, bombed three buses. In response and in revenge for past acts, "Mossad commandos, with the help of the Israeli Navy, assassinated PLO military commander and chief deputy Khalil Wazir (Abu Jihad)."⁹ In July 1989, "two men said to be members of a Gaza Fatah cell kill[ed]

⁹ Builta, p. 754.

an Israeli construction company owner.”¹⁰ Israel reacted a month later by killing five members of Fatah while trying to cross the Negev desert from Egypt.¹¹

The difficulty with Israel’s “eye for an eye” policy is that it has been in force for five decades and yet the Palestinian violence persists. Israel needed a policy that would end virtually all of the political or ideological Palestinian violence against them. As Glenn E. Robinson noted astutely and succinctly, “Israel’s main concern, properly enough, is to prevent buses from blowing up in Tel Aviv.”¹²

As a democracy, Israel required strong internal support for peace to bring about the Peace process. This internal support was created by a demand for personal security. This demand was created by random acts of violence committed by Palestinian terrorists. The security that the Israeli people sought could only come about by ending terrorism and this could be achieved by negotiating a real peace with the Palestinians.

Israel had pursued a pure realist approach for forty years and is now willing to allow a certain amount complex interdependence theory in the form of agreements and understandings backed by international laws and conventions to play a role in its foreign policy. This makes sense considering that by the time of the Oslo accords, Israel’s overall security vis-à-vis Arab neighbors was reasonable assured and maximizing welfare was a reasonable goal. However, Israel did not pursue a deal without also

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Glenn E. Robinson, “The Growing Authoritarianism of the Arafat Regime.” *Survival: The IISS Quarterly*, 1997.

strengthening its military in case the deal fails or perhaps to reinforce a deal with deterrence.

D. ORGANIZATION AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

The next three chapters of this thesis describe the three phases of Palestinian political violence since 1948 – guerrilla war, terrorism, and civil unrest. Each chapter presents the structures and constraints of the time period are presented to demonstrate the reason a specific type of political violence came about. Then some examples of the political violence in action are discussed. Lastly each of these three chapters ends with the Israeli and Israel's allies response to the particular type of political violence that faced it, and then how it found itself faced with yet another type.

Chapter II, The Palestinian Guerrilla War, focuses on the origin of the Palestinian diaspora, the use of Palestinian guerrillas in the diaspora by sponsor nations, the effects of the Suez and Six Day Wars on the guerillas, the sponsor nations, and Israel, and the transition from guerrilla war to terrorism.

The next chapter, *Chapter III, The Decades of Palestinian Terrorism*, deals with the rise of groups in engaged in the political violence of terrorism. This chapter compares three modes of terrorist operations as demonstrated in Al-Fatah, The Abu Nidal Group, and several Marxist-Leninist groups. The chapter continues with the Israeli and Western responses to Palestinian terrorism and ends with the effect that the fall of the Soviet Union had on Palestinian terrorism.

Chapter IV, Civil Unrest and Religious Revival in the Occupied Territories, deals with the rise of civil unrest as terrorism was waning. In addition, this chapter looks at the new threat of Palestinian political violence brought about by Islamist groups. In addition, low-level terrorism, mostly in Israel, continued during the *Intifada* suggesting that Israel and the West were able to curb but not end acts of terrorism. Israel attempted to manage the civil unrest of the *Intifada* by using a constabulary force in the occupied territories. This had little effect and in fact even contributed to Israeli desires for an end political violence once and for all through a land for security deal.

The last chapter of this thesis, *Chapter V: Political Violence, Security, and the Peace Process*, examines the overall impact of Palestinian political violence over time and Israel's attempt at a final solution by seeking a land for security peace deal. This chapter also includes recommendations for future study in related areas.

II. THE PALESTINIAN GUERRILLA WARS

The Palestinian Guerrilla Wars can be described clearly in two phases. The first phase consisted of almost total control of Palestinian forces by Arab nations that culminated in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. The second phase was after the 1956 Arab-Israeli war, the Suez War, and before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war was a conventional war that eliminated the capacity and will of the partisan supporting Arab nations to continue the guerrilla conflict ending the second phase.

The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section, section A, explains and describes the creation of Israel and the Palestinian refugee problem that this caused. The next section, section B, presents a model that describes and predicts the success or failure of guerrillas in their goals based on their ability to receive resources from endogenous and/or exogenous sources. This model is critical to the analyses that is presented in the subsequent sections of this chapter. Section C describes the origin of Palestinian guerrillas and the start of the partisan war against Israel. Section D presents and describes using the ideas presented in Section B, two levels of analyses of the first phase of Palestinian guerrilla war, 1948-1956. The two levels of analyses are the interstate and the substate levels. The last section, section E, describes the second phase of the Palestinian guerrilla war. This section is divided into two sections: the first describes and explains the developing crises that becomes the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the second section explains the Israeli response.

A. THE BIRTH OF A NATION, THE ORIGINS OF A TRAGEDY

Violence in the Middle East is nothing new. The conflict between Arabs and Jews existed before the state of Israel was refounded in 1948.¹³ Perhaps it was the Zionist movement of the late 19th century that led to discontent, insecurity, riots, and labor strikes, caused the conflict or perhaps, as some of the Western media like to portray it, it is as old as Abraham and remains the single longest sibling rivalry on earth. Whatever the emotional or theological cause, the conflict today is a contest over just one resource – land.

To paraphrase Avi Shlaim, historian and professor of international relations at the University of Oxford, the conventional Western and Israeli Zionist account of the 1948 War is roughly as follows. In 1947, the United Nations called for a partitioning of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab, with Jerusalem as an international city. The Jews accepted the plan despite the painful sacrifices it entailed but the Arab states and the Palestinians did not. With the expiration of the British Mandate, the Jews declared the independence of the state of Israel and the Arabs invaded. In the subsequent David versus Goliath conflict, Israel against all odds was triumphant. During the conflict, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled to the Arab states manly as a response to orders from their leaders.¹⁴

¹³ Israel, historically also known as Judea and Palestine, was ruled and/or administered by a Jewish political and religious elite from 1030 BCE to 70 CE.

¹⁴ Avi Shlaim, “The Debate About 1948,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v. 27, pp. 287-288, 1995.

In the opinion of most Arab authors, as well as some Israeli historians writing after the release of classified documents regarding the 1948 war, Israel's military victory can best be attributed to Arab confusion and collusion. The departure of Palestinians was a result of a policy of ethnic cleansing that led to the conquest of a unified territory of land mostly of a Jewish population in Palestine.

The Israeli force of 30,000 was challenged by Arab forces totaled 26,000 troops (increased to 35,000 by the first phase of the war) represented by the nations of Egypt (7,000), Iraq (4,000), Jordan (5,000), Lebanon (4,000), Syria (4,000), and Palestinian irregulars (4,000). Jordan's Arab Legion was the only professional Western style force, commanded by British General John Glubb. The Lebanese and Syrian forces were manned by former territorial militiamen while the Egyptian and Iraqi forces were led by poorly trained officers and were armed with older British-supplied arms. The Israeli force on the other hand was fully mobilized Haganah soldiers, two-thirds of whom were World War II veterans. These were supported by 32,000 reservists, 15,000 Jewish settlement police and another 32,000 home guards. By the first phase of the war Israel was fielding an army of 60,000 men and women at arms.¹⁵ If one were to compare populations, the odds were 30:1 against Israel; however, the odds if comparing soldiers was about 2:1 in Israel's favor. Moreover, there was the confusion. The Arab forces did not coordinate prior to the invasion, there was no unified command center, and the strategic goals for each nation was not the same and were at times even conflicting. For

¹⁵ Hiro, p. 19.

example, the conflict for Jordan and Egypt was more about which of the two nations was going to be regionally dominant after the war than it was about “pushing the Zionists into the sea.”

In Avi Shlaim’s work, *Collusion Across the Jordan*, the conflict becomes even more complex as it appears that Jordan’s King Abdullah may have had a secret agreement with David Ben Gurion and the Zionists perhaps brokered by the British. In short, the agreement was that Jordan would annex what would have been an independent Palestine in the West Bank, Israel would not put up much of a fight for this land and in return Jordan’s forces would not go all the way to Haifa and Tel Aviv. No agreement apparently was made over Jerusalem which was highly contested during the war. The Palestinians were simply the victims of this power play made between the governments around them.

Benny Morris in several of his works demonstrates to what extent the Israelis engaged in a program of ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in Israel and even more so in territories captured during the war. He argues the most of the upper and middle class Palestinians had left Palestine by the beginning of the war if their homes were located in the new Jewish state. However, he showed that:

“the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians was a result of direct attacks, fear of attacks, intimidation, psychological warfare (e.g.. the whispering campaign), and sometimes out-right expulsions ordered by the Haganah/IDF leadership.”¹⁶

¹⁶ Nur Masalha, “A Critique of Benny Morris,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, XXI, No. 1, p. 97, Autumn 1991.

As demonstrated in the above quote, the exodus of Palestinians was not do mostly to as a response to orders of their Arab leaders. The expulsion of Palestinians from Palestine is know in Arabic as al-Nakbah, the disaster. In *Palestine and the Palestinians* by Samih K. Farsoun, he describes the later portion of the war and of the expulsion as:

Beginning in the second half of April, Jewish military assaults led to the fall of Tabariyya (April 18), Haifa (April 23), Jaffa (April 25), West Jerusalem (April 26), eastern Galilee (April 28), the central plain between Latrun and Ramleh (May 8-9), Safad (May 11-12), Beisan (May 12), and the Naqab villages (May 12). The attacks were brutal. Through terror, psychological warfare, and direct conquests, Palestine was dismembered, many of its villages purposefully destroyed and much of its people expelled as refugees. As hundreds of thousands of refugees poured into safer areas of Palestine and into neighboring Arab countries...¹⁷

Many Israelis had hoped that this contest of arms that cost 18,500 Arabs and 6,000 Jews dead would be the end of the conflict. It was an unrealizable aspiration. The Israeli War of Independence that ended in 1948 would make way for a guerrilla conflict that lasted two decades.

¹⁷ Samih K. Farsoun and Christina E. Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, p. 114, Westview Press, 1997.

B. A MODEL FOR UNDERSTANDING GUERRILLA WAR




Figure 1. *Adamas Mysticus* (The Mystic Diamond)¹⁸

Though the partisan war of the Palestinians is often eclipsed by the Arab-Israeli conventional wars, it was a constant and visible challenge to Israelis' sovereignty and security. Consider the *Adamas Mysticus* (Mystic Diamond) displayed in Figure 1. This model, presented and described by Prof. McComick in the Navy Postgraduate School's Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare, describes the contest for control of the state between a guerilla force and the government. The model shows how endogenous and exogenous feedback provides the resources required to continue the conflict and ultimately the organization that dominates resources including population, land, and wealth will be the victor.

¹⁸ Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare presented by Gordon H. McCormick, Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 1999.

The *Adamas Mysticus* model is a graphical representation of the struggle for resources (e.g., labor, weapons, money, intelligence) between the state and the guerrilla faction. Resources can come from only two sources in this model, the population and the international community. The two players, the state and the guerrilla “counter-state,” take actions and the population (endogenous feedback) and the international community (exogenous feedback) react. This feedback then determines the amount of resources that are provided to the contestants by the population and international community and the cycle of resource – action – feedback - resource continues.

Using this model to analyze the Palestinian guerrilla war the first consideration is perhaps to eliminate endogenous feedback for the guerrillas. For in the case of Israel’s guerrilla war, the event was virtually all an exogenous affairs. The Palestinian guerrillas never succeeded in getting any significant resources from the population of Israel. Therefore, Israel never faced a true insurgency. The Palestinians were never realistically going to win over or coerce Israel’s Jewish population to support their cause by guerrilla tactics. Although there was some support given by Israel’s Arab population it never became an insurgence or a fifth column perhaps due to Israeli control and intelligence systems inside the state or perhaps it was simple not in the interest of Palestinians that had been granted Israeli citizenship to risk life and property for this cause at this time.




Figure 2. The Pump: a model describing feedback in a guerrilla war.¹⁹

Prof. McCormick uses a second model, *the pump* or *the system* model, to describe the process of the feedback step presented in the *Adamas Mysticus* model. It is shown graphically in Figure 2. Events that take place above the *Event Horizon* are the output of a guerrilla group. These are the actions that the world witnesses and on which the media reports. These actions are made possible by the resources the group is able to acquire. They include battles and skirmishes with the state, local politicking, and international public relations. Below the *Event Horizon* is where the actual contest for resources takes place.

The Pump model is describing a dynamic or systems in which an organization engages in an event that is noticed by the local population, the state, and/or the international community. The reaction by these players then determines the resources

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

that they will provide the guerrillas. The guerrillas use these new resources to engage in more acts. If things go as the guerrillas hope, with each reiteration of the cycle, the guerrillas will grow in resources like a pump filling a reservoir. Moreover, in viewing the conflict, the more that resources are provided by endogenous sources the more the war takes on a partisan nature. Conversely, the more that resources are provided by indigenous sources, the more the contest becomes an insurrection.

C. ORIGIN OF THE PALESTINIAN GUERRILLAS

From the middle of this century the contestants in the conflict no longer politically call themselves Jews and Arabs. After the advent of the Jewish State, the principle combatants are called Israel, Palestinians, and the Arab States. These belligerents engaged in a mostly partisan war from 1948 to 1967. On two occasions however, the partisan war morphed into a conventional test of arms between Israel and the Arab nations supporting and often directing the Palestinian guerrillas.

The structure of the conflict was created by the United Nations brokered cease-fire that created the borders of the new state of Israel. In November of 1948, the British vacated Palestine and relinquished their responsibility as the protectorate nation. The UN had attempted to implement a partition plane, General Assembly Resolution 181, that would give Gaza, Samaria (part of the West Bank), and northern Palestine to the Arab population which was approximately 64% of the total population. The remainder of the

land (approximately 54%) was to be given to the Jews, who made up approximately 35% of the total population.²⁰

The Arab nations publicly rejected the UN proposal. Although, Jewish leaders and the Hashemite regime in Jordan made a deal regarding Palestinian lands, behind closed doors, the overall situation was deteriorating to a military conflict. The British attempt to retain order was met with random violent attacks on their non-combatant personnel by both Jews and Arabs. In addition, month-long general strikes were common, causing a virtual stop to the Palestinian economy. The British moved-up their departure date from October to May. Concurrent with the British departure on 14 May, the Jewish Yishuv National Council declared the new territory as the state of Israel. On the same day, the Arab nations of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, declared war on the newly established state.

By July 1949, An armistice agreement was made between the belligerents on the Island of Rhodes ending direct hostilities. Israeli forces now occupied land composing 75% of the UN partition plane instead of the original 54% offered before the war.

At a conference held in 1949 in America, the United States pressed Israel to allow some 250,000 of the over one half million Palestinian refugees to return to Israel. Israel resisted the proposal. "Some Israelis feared that among those returning might be fifth columnists dedicated to terror."²¹

²⁰ Hiro, p. 19.

²¹ Martin Gilbert, *Israel*, William Morrow and Co., New York, 1998. p. 255.

D. PHASE ONE: FROM 1948 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR TO THE SUEZ WAR

1. The Partisan War: Interstate Level of Analysis

“Israel regarded the Armistice Agreement as non-aggression pacts between the parties. The Arab governments, on the other hand, regarded the armistices as incidents in a war, which left intact their general belligerent rights.”²²

In *Israel's Secret Wars* by Ian Black and Benny Morris they write “As the year's passed, the state's political and military leaders came to realize that Arab enmity was likely to remain constant for years to come and that the Arabs would make life as difficult as possible, both through economic and political sanctions and through low-level military harassment.”²³

Palestinians outside of Israel (the majority) that had gained some unconventional military experience as irregulars in the recent war were placed in small units that were going to be tasked to wage a partisan guerrilla war against Israel. The primary supporter of these groups was Egypt and to a lesser extent Syria. It was a policy of these two nations of sometimes supporting and sometimes curtailing and always attempting to control guerrilla activity. Jordan on the other hand always attempted to curtail Palestinian guerrilla activity. From all bordering nations, Palestinian guerrillas were soon active in cross border raids. Known by their supporters as the *fedayeen* or liberators, the *fedayeen* were responsible for over 1,300 Israeli deaths between 1949 and 1956.

²² The Jewish Agency for Israel, *The Department for Jewish Zionist Education*, [<http://www.jajz-ed.org.il>]. 1999.

²³ Ian Black and Benny Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars*, Grove Weidenfeld, New York, 1992. p. 89.

The title president is misleading. Nasser was not elected. King Faruq, the last monarch of Egypt, was personally embarrassed and his government was greatly weakened by the loss of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Moreover, his power was in actuality shored-up by British backing, a dynamic less and less pleasing to the population. He had become known as a "British Stooge." A clandestine military group of middle grade officers, the Free Officers, led by Nasser, opposed Faruq and succeeded in ousting him. Faruq was allowed to retire to Italy where, not surprisingly, he lived a life of luxury on the Riviera until his death in 1965.²⁴

Nasser's goals in the coup were clearly the accumulation of power ostensibly though the stated goal which was the 'elimination of corruption' However, not long after Nasser acquired his new position, he developed an ideology to go with it. Nasser galvanized Pan-Arabism. "Pan-Arabism is a doctrine that maintains that no matter where Arabs live they are part of a single community."²⁵ Popular support for Nasser in Egypt and in other Arab communities was immense creating a dangerous situation for the traditional conservative monarchies of other Arab nations. Faruq's fate was not lost on the kings of Jordan or Saudi Arabia.

Pan-Arabism was a huge mass movement and a powerful political tool and motivator. Nasser used this ideology to put pressure on the traditional monarchs by encouraging civil discontent in a loose policy of railing Arab unity to his causes and weakening his rival leaders' policies. Arguments for self-determination and unified Arab

²⁴ Hiro. p. 83.

²⁵ *Ibid.* p. 250.

causes destabilized the region. A non-avoidable component of this ideology was removing the "Zionist entity" from Arabia and returning the lost land to the Palestinians. This was the popular political motivation to support the partisan war.

Needless to say, the Government of Israel was very unhappy with Nasser, the persistent guerrilla war, and Pan-Arabism in general. Israel now looked to a way to rid itself of Nasser. In an attempt to discredit the Nasser regime, Israel embarked on an elaborate clandestine assassination operation. They were discovered and it was Israel that was embarrassed.

The operation consisted of local Jews performing as Israeli spies in Egypt ordered to plant bombs in areas frequented by westerners and assassinate members of the US consulate. All thirteen Jewish spies were captured. The Israeli defense minister, Pinchas Lavon, resigned over the matter.²⁶ The event now bears his name: the Lavon Affair. After the political fallout, Israel asked the Egyptians not to give death sentences to the spies. Egypt refused and executed all but six of the spies. Israel retaliated with a large Israeli Defense Force (IDF) raid into Gaza that attacked a Palestinian military barracks killing dozens of guerrillas.

As the guerrilla war progressed and the Israeli death toll increased to over one thousand by mid-1950, Nasser was engaged and distracted by other international challenges that faced Egypt. After the coup, Egypt no longer had a good relationship with traditional colonial powers and Egypt's relations with England particularly were very poor. Britain was being forced to close military bases on Egyptian soil near the

²⁶ *Ibid.* p. 177.

Suez Canal Zone; at this time Britain (and France) still owned half the Suez Canal Company. A long political battle between Britain and Egypt ensued. However, there was no ill feeling with the United States, yet. The US foreign policy makers hoped to encourage Egypt to move from an unaligned to a pro-West (anti-Soviet) position and hoped that Egypt would eventually sign a peace treaty with Israel. In order to facilitate this policy, "Eisenhower and Dulles at first tried to appeal to Nasser by offering to finance construction of the Aswan dam, and they tried to pacify the Egyptian-Israeli situation by sending special emissary Robert Anderson to broker a deal in early 1956."²⁷

The American attempt at a carrot failed. Nasser remained neutral in the Cold War conflict. In 1956, Nasser recognized the People's Republic of China at a time the United States only recognized Taiwan as the legitimate Chinese authority. As a response, Dulles withdrew American support to finance the Aswan High Dam project. This was the inflection point, as the Soviet Union stepped in and agreed to finance the dam as well as to sell arms to Egypt. Completely frustrated by the West, supported by the USSR, and still short on ready cash, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. This was the *causus belli* for England and France, but the politics of going to war had to still be overcome. Israel was their solution.

Israel, using the continued Palestinian infiltrations into Israel as its *causus belli*, made a secret agreement with the British and French. The agreement was structured to allow the Israelis to wage a conventional war in the Sinai for 24 hours. Then the British and French, claiming protection of free shipping in the Canal Zone, would demand an

²⁷ David W. Lesch, *The Middle East and the United States*, Westview Press, CO, 1999. p. 95.

end to all hostilities. The Israelis would, of course, agree. The Egyptians were expected to not comply. On 30 October 1956, this was exactly how the war played out. After Egypt refused to cease hostilities, the British and French engaged in an air war that eliminated the Egyptian air force.

On 2 November, the US and the USSR worked together to create a UN Security Council Resolution to end the crisis. This "Uniting for Peace" resolution condemned aggression against Egypt. Israel remained in the Gaza Strip and a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was placed in the Sinai Peninsula to keep the IDF and the Egyptian Army as well as Egyptian Palestinian guerrillas from direct contact.

The Palestinian guerrilla war did not end with Egypt's defeat, however. It merely moved its base of operations from Egypt to Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Figure 3 is a map of Israel in the early 1950's showing large scale Palestinian raids into Israel from 1951 to 1956. As the figure shows, by the 1950's, most raids were not launched from Egypt.




Figure 3. Large Scale Palestinian Guerrilla Raids into Israel (1951-1956) ²⁸

2. The Partisan War: Substate Level of Analysis

From 1949 to 1956, Palestinian infiltration across the border into the new state of Israel were quite common. Estimates are as high as 16,000 cases of infiltration in the year 1956. Most of these cases had nothing to do with guerrilla warfare. The motivation for these infiltration are varied and are on the level of analyses below the events that happen between national political elites such as Nasser; however, by reviewing them it helps to understand why some Palestinians were willing to work as guerrillas for Egypt and why many were entering Israel on there own and out of the control of Nasser or anyone else.

Benny Morris in his book *Israel's Border Wars* gives ten broad categories that describe the motivation of Palestinians to infiltrate Israel. They are politically motivated infiltration, intelligence-gathering, theft, robbery from Jews, smuggling, reclaiming possessions and crops, cross-border cultivation and grazing, visiting relatives,

²⁸ "Large Scale Palestine Guerrilla Raids into Israel" [<http://www.jajzed.org.il/100/maps/fed.html>], 1999.

resettlement in Israel, passage to and from Gaza, and fishing. Only the first four, politically motivated infiltration, intelligence-gathering, theft, robbery from Jews, and smuggling are directly related to the guerrilla war.

Morris describes the politically-motivated infiltrations as follows:

From the first, Israeli officials believed that some cross-border raiding was politically motivated and meant specifically to harm Israelis and/or Israel. Some 'political' infiltrators were motivated by a desire for vengeance, whether for national or personal wrongs suffered in 1948 or for the deaths of relatives in later border clashes with IDF troops. During the mid-1950s there were several cases of Arab Legionnaires taking private revenge after the death of relatives in IDF raids, and a number of avenging gangs emerged during 1949 and the early 1950s, primarily among West Bank refugees.

Some infiltrations, organized by followers of the ex-Mufti or by other political organizations (such as the Muslim Brotherhood), doubtless also sought to spark conflict between Israel and either Jordan or Egypt, with the aim of harming the Arab regime in question.²⁹

Morris also discusses a certain amount of infiltration, especially into Galilee in 1949, that was directed against Israeli Arabs. These Arabs were seen by some as collaborators. In 1949, two infiltrators were arrested who "had set out to kill two Lydda Arabs who were cooperating with the [Israeli] authorities."³⁰

Intelligence-gathering by infiltration and use of human intelligence across the border was fairly common especially along the Egyptian border. The Egyptians would send small squads across the border to collect information on Israeli military activity and

²⁹ Benny Morris, *Israel's Border Wars 1949-1956*, p. 35, Oxford University Press, 1993.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

installations. On occasion, these squads would brake into armories and steal weapons. Predictably, these incursions increased as the 1956 war grew near.

Theft from Jews did not begin with the 1948 war. UN observers made note of such activity before the war. One Egyptian document tells of a Gaza merchant who in 1950 and 1951 organized groups of infiltrators to steal irrigation pipes and other farming equipment from nearby Israeli villages. These activities combined with politically motivated infiltration that had a violent component caused some level of concern or even fear amongst Israelis. Israel's Deputy Director of Military Intelligence, Lieutenant-Colonel Harkabi is quoted as saying "most of the infiltrators... [were coming] over the border not to pasture their flocks or to harvest their crops but to steal and murder."³¹

In addition to politically motivated raids, intelligence-gathering, and theft, there was smuggling. Smuggling was usually between Arab refugees and Israeli Arabs and happened across all borders. On some occasions, Jews were involved in assisting or coordinating smuggling activity with Arabs. Most of the smuggling was farm and food products; however, arms were smuggled by the Muslim Brotherhood from Sinai to the West Bank where it was difficult to secure weapons and lunch operations due to the proximity of Jordan and its policy of limiting infiltrations.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

E. PHASE II: FROM THE SUEZ WAR TO THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

1. The developing Crisis

Ironically, Nasser's lack of a decisive defeat at the hands of Israel and the colonial powers was an Arab rallying point. From the Arabic point of view Nasser was a great victor. He was the hero of Pan-Arabism and a motivator for the Palestinian cause.

One Palestinian who was particularly motivated was the Egypt raised and educated Yasir Arafat. Arafat, called "Mr. Palestine" by the eminent Middle Eastern writer Edward Said, founded an organization in 1957 called *Fatah*. This organization had on occasion engaged in guerrilla operations. Already, by 1959, "the basic theory of Fatah ideology and tactics was that revolutionary violence, practiced by the masses was the only way to liberate Palestine and liquidate all forms of Zionism."³² Fatah, in order to conduct insurgency operations into Israel, created a specialized military force: *Al-Assifa*.³³ This unit engaged in a number of attacks and attempted attacks on Israeli targets including an attempt on a canal that was diverting water from the Jordan River. In *Military Communiqué Number One*, Arafat made claims to a great victory at the canal. In fact the attack, led by Ahmed Musa, had set a box of explosives and then the team left the area of the canal. An Israeli engineer saw the box and disconnected the trigger from the detonator, foiling the attack. Ironically, the communiqué alone, regardless of the

³² Builta, p. 83.

³³ The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) also adopted the name *Al-Assifa* in the 1970's when it broke with Fatah.

impotence of the attack, inspired many Palestinians and provided Arafat with new recruits.³⁴

The 2nd Arab Summit, assembled in Alexandria, Egypt in 1964, created the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) with the goal to “liberate Palestine from Zionist imperialism.”³⁵ The PLO was originally the brainchild of Nasser. He hoped to use it as the officially recognized voice of the Palestinians, a voice that he hoped to control.³⁶ In addition the summit established the Palestine Liberation Army as the military wing of the PLO and dedicated it to a military struggle in removing the Zionist entity. PLA units were placed in the armies of several of the Arab nations where they were trained in traditional warfare and were used to fight in the Arab-Israel conventional wars.

In the late 1960's, Syria began supporting the Palestinian guerrilla cause more directly. From their position on the Golan Heights, the Syrians shelled Israeli settlements, attacked fishing boats on the Kinneret (the Sea of Galilee) and fired on agricultural workers in the demilitarized zones along the border. In addition, they financed and provided weapons for various Palestinian guerrilla groups. In 1966, Syria and Egypt signed a mutual defense pact.

³⁴ Kameel B. Nasr, *Arab and Israeli Terrorism*, pp. 36-40, McFarland & Company, 1997.

³⁵ Hiro, p. 23.

³⁶ Al-Fatah and Arafat did not join the PLO until 1969, after the Six Day War. He was also made chairman of the Executive Committee upon Al-Fatah's joining the umbrella organization.

“In April 1967, the Syrian interference with farming operations in the demilitarized zones on the Kinneret were stepped up, with increased shelling on Israel villages. An air battle developed, in which Syria lost six planes. The Syrians turned to the Egyptians, expressing their fear of an impending Israel attack.”³⁷ To add to the Syrian’s unease, the USSR warned erroneously that an Israeli attack was planned the following month. The seeds of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war were sown.

Israel had made it clear to United States officials that any one of the following would be a *causus belli*. One, the departure of the United Nation Emergency Force (UNEF) from the Sinai; two, the blockading of the Tiran Straits; three, the signing of a Jordanian-Egyptian defense pact; four, a significant increase in Palestinian guerrilla activity, or, five, the dispatch of Iraqi forces to Jordan. By the end of May 1967, four of the five *causus belli* had come to fruition.³⁸

Guerrilla activity was ongoing and as such that pre-condition arguably had already been met. Israel, thus was more concerned with an increase in activity. The increase of activity on the border with Egypt just prior to the war was the sort of activity for which Israel was on guard.

On May 16, 1967, Nasser ordered the UN to remove the United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) of 3,400 men. The force had been separating Israeli forces

³⁷ The Jewish Agency for Israel, *The Department for Jewish Zionist Education*, Available on-line at: <http://www.jajz-ed.org.il/>

³⁸ Hiro, p. 20.

from direct contact with Egyptian forces from the Mediterranean down the Sinai Peninsula to Sharm el-Sheikh on the Red Sea.

Surprising Israel and the United States, United Nations Secretary General, U Thant, accepted the order to withdraw without objection. U Thant recognized the argument that the force had been put in place in 1956 only with Egypt's consent and consequently could be ordered to leave by Egypt regardless of the destabilizing regional effects.³⁹

Within four days after the UNEF withdrawal Nasser had full military control of the Sinai. Israeli political and military elite took these actions as a very serious national threat. As a first response, on May 20, Israel commenced a partial mobilization of reserves. For Israel and its "citizen's army," this mobilization meant a "virtual stop to the Israeli economy."⁴⁰

The next event on the course toward a conventional confrontation was described by President Johnson as "illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace."⁴¹ On May 22, President Nasser announced that Egypt was reimposing the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Tiran Straits. Israeli ships were no longer able to sail to or from Eilat effectively cutting off the eastern half of the globe to Israel. In a speech to Egyptian

³⁹ Martin Gilbert, *Israel*, William Morrow and Co., New York, 1998.
p. 366-367.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* p. 367

⁴¹ *Ibid.* p. 371

fighter pilots made at Bir Gafgafa, an air force base on the Sinai Peninsula, Nasser declared:

We are in confrontation with Israel.... We are face to face with Israel. Henceforward the situation is in your hands. Our armed forces have occupied Sharm el-Sheikh... We shall on no account allow the Israeli flag to pass through the Gulf of Akaba. The Jews threaten to make war. I reply: *Alhan wa sahlán* – ‘Welcome!’ We are ready for war.⁴²

The United States, Great Britain, Canada, The Netherlands, and Denmark had agreed to partake in a maritime intervention in the Mediterranean and Red Sea. The US asked Israel to wait at least forty-eight hours before committing to a course. Israel agreed.

On May 24, UN Secretary General U Thant flew to Cairo in a last attempt to advert the pending war. Nasser was asked to make a commitment to “not use his forces for war.” Nasser refused to make that commitment to U Thant and the UN. U Thant returned to New York, his mission a failure.

Israel was in a period of anxiety and anticipation, known in Israel as the *hamtana* (waiting). The plan for naval intervention by Western maritime nations was not proceeding well. Mostly due to asset distribution, the key players, US and Great Britain, could not get warships in the area in a timely enough manner to advert a confrontation between Israel and Egypt. In addition, Nasser again escalated the crisis.

On May 30, Nasser had a meeting with King Hussein of Jordan. The King was enthusiastic about an agreement between their two states. After reviewing a copy of the

⁴² *Ibid.* p. 368.

Syrian-Egyptian treaty, the king said “give me another copy; let us replace the word Syria by the word Jordan and the matter will be arranged.”⁴³

On June 2, Iraq had 150 tanks moving through Jordan to take up positions on the Israeli border. One *causus belli* would have been enough for Israel; however, all five *causus belli* had been met by early June; a conventional war seemed unavoidable. Israel’s force of 264,000 men, 800 tanks, and 300 aircraft was up against a combined Arab force of 350,000 men, 1750 tanks, and 700 aircraft.

2. The Israeli Response

Israel had hoped that a decisive military victory could end the persistent Palestinian guerrilla war. What followed was a mixed blessing. The war was a great success for Israel. The Egyptian airforce was eliminated on the first morning of the conflict by an Israeli preemptive strike. Land forces captured the Sinai, the Golan, and the West Bank. In addition, *Beni Yisrael*⁴⁴, two thousand years after the Romans evicted them during the Jewish Revolt, were back in Jerusalem. The Palestinian guerilla war was over; the Israelis now controlled all territories that could reasonably be used to launch operations. Moreover, the Arab nations that supported the partisan war were defeated by the conventional forces of Israel. However, the violence did not end. Those Palestinians committed to the cause and willing to engage in the use of political violence to achieve it

⁴³ Gilbert p. 377

⁴⁴ *Beni Yisrael*, literally “children of Israel (Jacob).” The term has the advantage from the Jewish perspective that it covers the all the various time periods of the Abrahamic tribe’s history predating the advent of the tribe being called “Jews.” Thus the

sought alternatives. The Palestinian Fedayeen guerrillas were gone; the Palestinian terrorist was born.

Understanding that Israel was facing a partisan war supported primarily by Egypt, Israel would occasionally attack and counter-attack Palestinian guerrilla targets across its borders. This was mostly a conventional (force on force) response to a guerilla war and had limited if any success. Israel's real success was its two conventional wars that attacked (and defeated) the enabler of the guerrillas and ended exogenous support for the guerrillas. It was in the loss of the second of these conventional wars, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, that the inflection point presented in this chapter took place: guerrilla war as the primary type of political violence was replaced by terrorism as the primary type.

term includes the time period of the Hebrews, Israelite, Jews, and Israelis, a period of approximately 4,500 years. The term "Jew" is approximately only half as old.

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III. THE DECADES OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISM

This chapter explains the development of Palestinian terrorist organizations and describes some of their activities. The first section, section A, explains the transition from guerrilla war to terrorism. The next two sections, section B and C, are case studies of two of the most important and noted terrorist groups: Al-Fatah and the Abu Nidal Organization. The next section, section D, is a presentation of some of the other critical Palestinian terrorist organization vis-à-vis bring political violence against Israel, Israel's allies, and Jew. Section E is divided into four subsections. Each section is a look at what responses and outcomes developed overtime to counter or slow Palestinian terrorism.

A. THE TRANSITION FROM GUERRILLA WARFARE TO TERRORISM

Terrorism can be a rational choice. Martha Crenshaw in *The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice* argues that terrorism may follow a logical process that can be discovered and explained. The resorting to this from of political violence by a group is a willful choice made by a group for political and strategic reasons, rather than as the unintended outcome of psychological or social factors. Crenshaw describes the decision to engage in terrorism as a cost versus benefit analysis. She writes:

An organization or a faction of an organization may choose terrorism because other methods are not expected to work or are considered too time-consuming, given the urgency of the situation and the government's superior resources.... Whether or not to use terrorism is one of the most divisive issues resistance groups confront, and numerous revolutionary movements have split on the question of means even after agreeing on common political ends.⁴⁵

After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war the possibility of a successful partisan-led guerrilla war had gone from improbable to impossible. Individuals and organizations committed to the armed struggle against Israel and desiring to continue the violence had no alternative but terrorism. Virtually all of these groups were secular nationalists and usually financed by a foreign government.

Abu Iyad, chief of Fatah's intelligence and security, wrote in his autobiography:

"Fatah's young men... unable to wage a classic guerrilla war across Israel's borders... insisted on carrying out revolutionary violence of another kind, commonly known elsewhere as 'terrorism'."⁴⁶

By its nature and in order for it to be efficacious terrorism must be horrific and the targets must appear by the third party to be randomly selected. It is in this chaos that the terrorist organization gains influence. The terrorist leader can increase or decrease the chaos as resources and politically desired outcomes dictate. In the 1970's and 1980's the resources were adequate and the political outcome desired was strong enough to

⁴⁵ Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," *Origins of Terrorism*, p. 17, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998.

⁴⁶ Niel C. Livingstone and David Halevy, *Inside the PLO*, p. 100, Robert Hale, 1991.

create the most complex, daring, and infamous acts of political violence in recent memory.

B. CASE STUDY: AL FATAH

Established by Yasir Arafat in 1959, Fatah is the largest and best known of the PLO organizations. For two score years, Fatah was committed to the use of violence against Israel, its allies, and other enemies of the PLO.

Born Muhammad Abdul Rauf al Qudwa, Arafat was given the nickname Yasser, the carefree. He was born in Cairo and lived there through college. He received an engineering degree from Cairo University, where he was chairman of the local Palestinian Students Union. In 1958, he formed a clandestine organization called Fatah. Five years later it was allowed to open an office in Algiers and to train commandos there. "This was in line with the Fatah strategy of employing popular revolutionary violence to liberate the Palestinian homeland."⁴⁷

Over the years, Fatah has been involved in assassinations, bombings, hijackings, military actions, training of other terrorist and revolutionary groups including those operating in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

In 1965, Fatah began to mount armed raids into Israel. In 1971, the group attacked economic targets including fuel tanks in Rotterdam and Royal Jordanian Airlines' (Alia) office in Rome. They hijacked an Alia plane to Algeria and assassinated

⁴⁷ Hiro, p. 29.

the Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi el-Tal. In March of 1975, Fatah overran the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Sudan, killing the US and Belgian ambassadors. In 1985, Fatah killed three Israeli Mossad agents in Larnaca, Cyprus.⁴⁸

Fatah has a number of organizations that report to it. Some of the links are overt and others covert. Black September - the cell's name comes from the overwhelming Palestinian defeat at the hands of the Jordanian army in the Jordanian Civil War of September 1970 - was one of Fatah's covert links and as such its actions were deniable by the PLO. Authoritative texts have supported the PLO's claim that Black September broke away for the PLO umbrella; in John Thackrah's *Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence*, he argues that Black September broke away because of the PLO's desire to find a political solution.⁴⁹ However, Niel Livingstone and David Halevy in *Inside the PLO*, argue convincingly that Black September was the covert arm of Jihaz el-Razd, the intelligence and reconnaissance branch of Fatah and whose overall commander was Abu Iyad.⁵⁰

Black September is perhaps the most infamous of all Palestinian terrorist organizations. Its reputation comes from its activities in the summer of 1972. In that year, eight members of the cell slipped into the Olympic Village in Munich, Germany and made their way to the Israeli team's apartment. Led by a Libyan, Mohammed Masalhad, the terrorist team entered the apartment and killed an athlete and a coach.

⁴⁸ Builta. pp. 750-753.

⁴⁹ Livingstone, p. 105.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 105-106.

They took nine hostages and demanded the release of 234 Arab prisoners in Israeli jails and two German terrorists held in Germany. More than half a billion people watched the seventeen-hour standoff. The terrorists and their hostages were transported to Föstenfeldbruvk airfield. German snipers opened fire. Five terrorists and all nine hostages were killed.⁵¹

This was dubbed the "Games of Peace" and it was Germany's first Olympics since the Nazi sponsored Olympics of 1936. Germany was hoping to regain some needed international good will in the venue of athletic games. Black September has made the Munich Olympics virtually synonymous with outrageous acts of terrorism. After the attack, both Germany and Israel were in mourning.

Surpassing Black September in infamy is The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO). The ANO, a rejectionist and extremely violent group, is responsible for 90 attacks in over 20 nations killing more than 300 and injuring 600.⁵² In 1988, *Terrorist Group Profiles* called the ANO, "the most dangerous terrorist organization in existence."⁵³

C. CASE STUDY: THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION

Abu Nidal was born Sabri al-Banna in Jaffa in 1936. In 1967, Abu Nidal joined Fatah and later served as the PLO's representative in Sudan. In 1970, he became the

⁵¹ *Ibid.* pp. 106-107.

⁵² Builta. p. 741.

⁵³ *Terrorist Group Profiles*, 1988. p. 5.

head of both Fatah and the PLO in Iraq. Overtime, Abu Nidal's and the PLO drifted apart as his views grew closer to Iraq's. Soon, Iraq was using Abu Nidal and the PLO lost control over him. In 1974, Arafat gave his "gun and olive branch" speech at the United Nations General Assembly. Abu Nidal was disturbed by the speech and used it as the reason for his final separation from the PLO. He formed the Fatah Revolutionary Council to counter what he perceived as a lack of *real* action by the original Fatah. The PLO responded by trying Abu Nidal *in absentia* and forcing him out of the organization. He established his own organization, the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), which was Iraqi sponsored. The ANO also confiscated all PLO resources in Iraq.

The organization is made-up of several hundred militia operating out of Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Iraq. The Central Committee serves as a decision-making body and has been headquartered in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. The group has been involved in assassinations, hijacking, mass killings, bombings, and suicide bombings.

In 1980, the ANO killed the Israeli Commercial Attaché in Brussels. In 1981, the organization machine-gunned a synagogue in Vienna killing two and wounding seventeen. In 1982, ANO bombed a Parisian restaurant frequented by French Jews, killing six and wounding twenty-two. In 1983 the ANO made two attempts on the lives of Jordanian ambassadors. In 1984, the organization assassinated the British diplomat in Athens and the High Commissioner in Bombay. In 1986, the ANO attacked a synagogue in Istanbul, killing twenty-two. The list continues and much of it is beyond the scope of this work.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 5-7.

In March of 1988, the ANO attacked an Alitalia airline crew aboard a bus in India. In May, the ANO detonated a car bomb in Cyprus by the Israeli Embassy killing three and wounding seventeen. Abu Nidal claimed the car bomb as retaliation for the killing of Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad). In the same month, ANO attacked the Acropole Hotel and Sudan Club in Khartoum killing eight and injuring twenty-one.⁵⁵

Unlike many other secular nationalist Palestinian terrorist groups, the ANO continued to operate after the late 1980's and the advent of the *Intifada*, the conclusion of the Second Gulf War, and signing of the declaration of principles. ANO was able to operate because it had both Iraqi support and its own significant level resources it developed over time. In 1989, Abu Nidal liquidated 150 of 300 cadres of the organization. In 1991, two days prior to the beginning of the Gulf War, an ANO plant Abu Zeid, a PLO bodyguard, killed Abu Hol and Abu Iyad both high-ranking PLO members in Tunis.

The ANO continued to make a number of attacks and attempts on PLO and Fatah members. In 1995, five members were arrested trying to cross into Gaza from Egypt. The Palestinian Authority understood that they were trying to assassinate Chairman Arafat.⁵⁶ Almost none of the attacks committed by the ANO after 1988 were against Israelis. They were either random attacks on Western allies of Israel or against Palestinian organizations that were more willing to work with Israel.

⁵⁵ Builta. p. 738.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 738-741.

D. OTHER PALESTINIAN TERRORIST GROUPS

Three other influential secular national terrorist organizations worth mentioning are the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). All three have a Marxist-Leninist orientation.

Dr. George Habash after the Six Day War Palestinian disaster, united three small groups to form the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. He is called *al-Hakim*, ‘the physician’ or ‘the wise man’, and he has pledged to an ideology of a total liberation of all of Palestine. The PFLP headquarters are in Damascus and the organization is Syrian sponsored. Habash’s group is a violent Marxist revolutionary organization. It has often been involved in the causes of other Marxist groups including those that had been operating in Germany and France. In these operations, Habash has received much notoriety as well as a reputation for ruthlessness.⁵⁷

Some of the highlights of “the physician’s” long lists of operations includes the 1968 hijacking of an EL AL airliner en route from Rome to Israel. In 1972 with the assistance of the Japanese Red Army, the PFLP machined-gunned tourists at the Lod Airport in Tel Aviv: twenty-seven were killed including sixteen Puerto Rican pilgrims. The following year the PFLP threw a hand-grenade into a movie theater killing three and injuring fifty-four.

It was Habash’s outrageous simultaneous hijacking of two airliners to Jordan and a third to Egypt that openly displayed the weakness of the Hashemite regime. This

⁵⁷ *Terrorist Group Profiles*. p. 25.

incident was a proximate cause of the civil war waged between the Palestinians and Jordanians fought by Jordan to restore authoritative and legitimate power in the Hashemite government.

Habash's success in outlandish terrorist acts caused some of his Communist Bloc supporters to begin to condemn him. With this as a new motivator, the PFLP in the 1980's ceased international operations and focused on more traditional terrorist actions and even some guerrilla operations against Israeli targets.⁵⁸

In 1984, the PFLP killed three passengers on an Israeli bus. Later that year, in another bus attack, one Israeli was killed and eight passengers wounded. In 1987, a 22-year-old student was stabbed to death and also in that year the PFLP claimed responsibility for rocket attacks on the town of Metullah in Galilee.

"As a result of ideological inflexibility, internal disputes, and personality conflicts, the PFLP spawned several splinter groups".⁵⁹ Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) was one of these splinter groups. After being disenchanted with Habash's leadership, Jibril broke away and in 1968 formed his own organization.

Jibril was a captain in the Syrian Army and wished to use his knowledge of conventional warfare to focus more on a guerrilla conflict such as ground, air, and sea infiltration and less on terrorism; however, the PFLP-GC did not give-up on terrorism altogether.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

PFLP-GC activities include letter bombs, hijackings, and machine-gun attacks. Their guerrilla attacks were generally cross-border raids from Syria. In 1969, the PFLP-GC hijacked a TWA airliner and then destroyed the plane. In 1974, the organization attacked and secured an Israeli apartment in Qiryat Shemona. Eighteen Israelis were killed and sixteen were wounded. An Israeli assault team engaged the terrorists in a four-hour gun battle. All three terrorists were killed.

A PFLP-GC member was made legendary to his supporters when in 1987 he successfully penetrated Israel from Lebanon using an ultra-light hang glider. The terrorist attacked and killed six IDF members and wounded seven others. The terrorist was killed in the action by the IDF.⁶⁰

Of lesser fame than Fatah and PFLP is the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Like the PFLP and the PFLP-GC, the DFLP is a Marxist ideological based organization. Naif Hawatmeh, leader of the DFLP, professed a conviction that the Palestinian national goal could not be achieved without a revolution of the proletariat. Thus it is not surprising that in the 1970's and 1980's, the Soviet Union supported the DFLP, after 1991, however, the DFLP had become dependent on Syrian support. In addition to the struggle for Palestine, the DFLP sought to overthrow the conservative Arab monarchies as well as "affirm[ed] its hostility and resistance to US policy in the region."⁶¹ Though dependent on Syria for backing, the DFLP is fiercely independent and strongly disapproving of the PLO's leadership.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 26-27.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 10.

One of the DFLP's most remembered actions was the attack of a schoolhouse in Ma'alot, Israel, in 1974. In this attack twenty-seven were killed and 134 were wounded, many of them were children. In addition, over the last two decades, the DFLP has engaged in bus bombings, grenade attacks, and in 1988 the DFLP attempted an assassination of Israeli politician Ariel Sharon.

A newer terrorist group, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) formed in 1977 and lead by Tal'at Yaqub in Syria and Abu Abbas in Iraq, made headlines in 1985 with the hijacking (or pirating) of an Italian cruise liner.

The PLF, an organization that broke from the PFLP-GC, had hijacked the Italian liner the *Achille Lauro*. After holding hostages for two days and killing a wheelchair bound Jewish American, Leon Klinghoffer, the terrorists surrendered to Egyptian authorities. Abu Abbas was apprehended at a NATO airbase in Italy after US military aircraft forced the Egyptian airliner, carrying him to safety, to land.

There are many other organizations that have engaged in terrorist actions to force pressure on Israel, the West, or simply to "do something" to continue the armed struggle for an independent Palestine.

E. RESPONSES AND OUTCOMES VIS-À-VIS PALESTINIAN TERRORISM

1. Israel's Response To Palestinian Terrorism

When faced with the Palestinian guerrilla war Israel was able to end the support for this form of Palestinian political violence by ending the will of the supporting nations. After the 1967 War, support of a partisan war had ended. However, faced with the political violence of terrorism Israel tried a number of alternatives including covert

operations, overt operations, and eventually Israel tried a repeat of the strategy that had worked in ending the guerrilla war —Israel invaded its neighbor.

Perhaps the massacre at the Munich Olympics was the turning-point. After the massacre, Prime Minister Golda Meir gave the orders to seek vengeance, not just for its own sake, but also as a deterrent. Zvi Zamir, head of the Mossad at the time, developed hit squads to carry out the Prime Minister's orders. They were often quite successful. In *Israel's Secret Wars*, by Ian Black and Benny Morris, they write:

During the ten months following the Munich debacle, at least nine men associated by the Israelis with Palestinian terrorism were killed in violent circumstances. Some of the assassinations may have been unconnected to Munich. Wael Zwaiter, for example, who was shot dead in Rome (where he was the official PLO representative) on 16 October, was held responsible by the Israelis for organizing the first hijack of the El Al jet to Algeria in August 1968 and also for the booby-trapped tape recorder smuggled aboard an El Al plane in August 1972.... Hamshari was the PLO representative in the French capital and, like Zwaiter, more of an intellectual than a terrorist. But the Israelis believed he had been involved in several incidents, including Munich. Hussein al-Shir, assassinated in Nicosia on 25 January 1973, was described as the PLO's contact man with the Soviet KGB in Cyprus. He was killed by a bomb placed under the bed in his room at the Olympic Hotel. That device was also detonated by remote control.⁶²

The Mossad was not the only Israeli organization involved in assassinations. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) had its own unique unit. In 1973, Israel's special forces group Sayaret Matkal assassinated Abu Yusef in his home in Beirut. Abu Yusef is credited with being the mastermind and creator of Black September. A team of 30 commandos landed in Zodiac rafts near the city. The group split in two. One team

⁶² Ian Black and Benny Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars*, p. 273, Grove Weidenfeld, 1991.

headed to Abu Yusef's apartment and gunned him down. The other team blew up the headquarters of the DFLP. Several Israeli commandos were killed and wounded during the raid. The teams were unable to return to their rafts and Israeli helicopters were forced to extract them. One of the teams was lead by a young commando, Ehud Barak.

Fifteen years after the raid that had killed Abu Yusef, Israel conducted a similar raid into Tunisia to eliminate the number two man at the PLO and overall military commander of the organization, Abu Jihad (Khalil Ibrahim Mahmud al-Wazir). An Israeli naval group of two missile boats headed to a rendezvous point off the coast of Tunis. The Israeli commando teams again used Zodiac boats to make landfall. The first team went to the front door of Abu Jihad's apartment and a second group went to his rear entrance. A third team stayed just beyond his home. The first team killed Abu Jihad's bodyguard and driver. Then the first and second team broke into Abu Jihad's apartment and killed three guards. They entered his bedroom and killed him next to his sleeping wife. She was unharmed. The overall operational commander, located on one of the two missile boats, was an experienced middle aged commando, Ehud Barak.

After the Jordanian civil war of 1970, much of the PLO and the operations of terrorist groups came out of Lebanon. The government of Israel hoped to end the terrorism from Lebanon in a manner similar to the way they succeeded in ending the Palestinian guerrilla wars -- by invading the nation from which it was coming. In Spring of 1978, Israel invaded southern Lebanon with the proximate cause being a Palestinian attack a week earlier. Israel failed in ending Palestinian terrorism with this invasion primarily because Lebanon was not directly sponsoring the Palestinian terrorists. Israel had succeeded in ending the Palestinian guerrilla war by invading the sponsor nation and

thus making it no longer in their interest to support the Palestinians. The terrorists groups, however, were sponsored by nations such as Syria, Iraq, and the Soviet Union, not Lebanon. Lebanon was only the base of operations and many groups were able to continue to operate under Israeli occupation with the aid of their sponsors.

Israel did succeed, however, in getting deeply involved in the collapsing politics of Lebanon at the time with its support of Maronite leaders Pierre Gemayel and Camille Chamoun. Following a failed assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador to Britain in late spring of 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon again. Later that summer, Bashir Gemayel, the president-elect of Lebanon who had the backing of Israel, was killed in a explosion at Phalange party headquarters. Israeli units occupied Beirut and the Phalange used the Israeli protection to massacre Palestinians in the refugee camps at Sabra and Shatila.

The PLO left Lebanon in 1982, after the second Israeli invasion and set up shop in Tunisia. Israel was thus finally successful in ending a large amount of Palestinian terrorism that operated out of Lebanon. However, the terrorism did not end although after 1982 it was significantly diminished. Israel found a new enemy in Lebanon with Hizbollah, a non-Palestinian group engaged in political violence aimed at encouraging Israel to end its occupation. Syrian forces entered in 1984 and have remained ever since. Syria allows a small amount of terrorism and guerrilla operations to operate out of Lebanon by groups that it sponsors.

The Israelis pursued the PLO in Tunisia mostly with covert actions; however, in October, 1985, the Israelis bombed PLO headquarters. Seventy-one people were killed. However, Israel failed in getting its main target, Chairman Arafat.

In addition to Israel's covert actions and assassinations, there is significant evidence that Israel was able to play one Palestinian group against another. Most legendary among the Middle East conspiracy writers is the Abu Nidal connection. In *Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire* Patrick Seal brings forward evidence that the ANO was a willing or duped accomplice in killing PLO leaders for the Israelis. Seal is unclear if Abu Nidal was co-opted by the Mossad. He suggests that the Mossad was able to place people in high advisory positions in the ANO and these agents were able to influence targets and operations. The ANO often went after PLO moderates claiming that they were either not aggressive enough in the fight for Palestine or that they were in league with the Zionists. These killings helped Israel by eliminating individuals whose moderate message might be listened to in the West -- an eventuality Israel was not yet ready with which to deal. Thus the conspiracy theory, true or not, was born. In any event, many PLO leaders such as the late Abu Iyad firmly believe the ANO-Mossad connection theory.

2. Western Responses To Palestinian Terrorism

American and European civilians were being killed and wounded by Palestinian terrorists, money was being lost due to assets and services being destroyed or disrupted by terrorism, and Middle East interests were being destabilized by the continued

violence. It is clearly understandable that the Western powers sought a solution to the terrorist problem.

The western nations pursued a number of avenues in seeking a solution. Most of their actions fell into the following categories: international conventions, political action, military action, covert action, and appeasement and settlements.

Following the attack of the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, asked the General Assembly to consider the issue of terrorism. This was a very difficult issue. Many nations were concerned that a wide definition of terrorism would allow foreign nations to impose themselves on the sovereignty of another nation in the name of counter-terrorism.⁶³

The United States in 1972 led the debate and put forward a draft entitled *Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism*. This proposal was rejected by Third World nations that felt that it would detract from the legitimacy of the use of violence in self-determination especially from colonial rule. The United Nations had previously affirmed the legitimacy of violence in self-determination and these nations felt that the US proposal was to weaken their position. Many non-Western Nations argued that this proposal was specifically designed to remove the Palestinian right to self-determination. A compromise was reached and in 1985, thirteen years after the first proposal, the assembly adopted a resolution condemning particular forms of terrorism.⁶⁴

⁶³ Adrian Guelke, *The Age of Terrorism*, p. 166, I.B. Tauris Pub., 1995.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

Outside the context of the United Nations, Western Nations also organized conventions and agreements to counter terrorism. The *1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism* defined a number of terrorist acts and stated that for the purposes of extradition, these acts could not be called political crimes. The list included the scope of offenses of The Hague and Montreal Conventions, such as kidnapping, hostage-taking, and offenses using bombs, grenades, rockets, automatic firearms, mail bombs, etc.

Specific conventions met to deal with the unique cases of hijacking and hostage taking. Prior to the 'decade of terrorism' in the 70's and 80's, hijacking was little more than forcing a plane to land somewhere else than where planned (i.e. Cuba in stead of Miami). However, individuals like Dr. Habash made hijacking an act that included hostage tacking and the destruction of very valuable assets. It was at this time that the UN and the Western World began listing hijacking as a form of international terrorism.

The first convention on hijacking was the 1963 *Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft*. This convention recognized that the jurisdiction for trial of the perpetrators was to be the nation in which the aircraft was registered. In addition, the convention laid down rules for dealing with the offenders.⁶⁵

The 1970 *The Hague Convention* added language regarding the 'seizure of an aircraft' as part of the terrorist action definition. The 1971 *Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation* included attacks on airports as well as aircraft as international terrorist acts. In 1991, *The Convention of the*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 164-165.

Marking of Plastic Explosives for Detection assisted in prophylactic measures to prevent the bombing of aircraft.⁶⁶

To limit and fight hostage taking by terrorists, a number of conventions dealt with the protection of diplomats and their families. The 1961 *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* and the 1963 *Convention on Consular Relations* insisted on the inviolability of diplomatic agents, their staff, and their families. In addition, these conventions made host nations responsible for their safety. The 1979 *International Convention against the Taking of Hostages* part of the *Geneva Convention* forbade the taking of hostages at all times, including during armed conflict. This convention had great power by setting standards in international law on the topic of hostages.

Conventions had a positive effect, yet they failed in overall intent. They were powerful in setting international law and norms as well as providing ammunition in cases requiring extradition. These conventions attempted to prevented attacks by stepping-up awareness and constabulary activity. Moreover, courts had been shored up by these conventions in their ability to prosecute and sentence terrorists. Yet, they did not significantly deter terrorism. The were more effective in prosecution then prevention. Therefor, the fight to counter terrorism was located on another battlefield.

The United States and its Western allies sought a solution to terrorism in the political arena. In the 1980's, President Reagan took the stand that "the United States does not negotiate with terrorists." This adage and its corresponding policy implications for Palestinian-supported violence were twofold: one, the United States used this policy

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

to avoid recognition of and negotiating directly with the Palestinian Liberation Organization until Chairman Arafat publicly renounced and condemned terrorism; and two, all talks with these organizations had to be done clandestinely or through third parties.

These political policies did little to deter or counter terrorism. The policy did not keep the US, particularly the Reagan administration, from negotiating with terrorists or at least their supporting nations clandestinely. The clearest example would be the deals made by National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane with the Islamic Revolutionary government of Iran to free hostages in Lebanon in exchange for military equipment: *The Iran-Contra Affair*.

Although the PLO has renounced terrorism and has been recognized by the US this cannot be attributed to US policy. Instead, it was the recognition of the organization by Israel as the voice of the Palestinians and the advent of the Oslo Accords that altered US policy vis-à-vis the PLO. In short, with the advent of the Palestinian Authority, the PLO has the legitimate use of violence within the area under its authority. As such, terrorism – the illegitimate use of violence – at this point is a non-sequitur.

Military actions by the US also did little to deter Palestinian terrorism. It did in fact increase terrorism against the US by non-Palestinian groups. In 1982 the United States landed troops in the Eastern Mediterranean for the first time since 1958. Ostensibly US forces were to bring calm to a complex quagmire of a civil war in Lebanon to mediate the conflict between Israel and the PLO. This was more than a counter-terrorism

operation; however, its impact on that fight can not be understated nor ironically the increase in non-Palestinian that it caused.⁶⁷

This military action succeeded in forcing the PLO to leave Lebanon and resettle in Tunisia. With regards to Palestinian terrorism against Israel this was a major success. Cross-border actions and operations had been eliminated. Unfortunately, Israel's continued military occupation of southern Lebanon has caused other non-Palestinian groups (*Hizbollah*, et al.) to resort to guerrilla and terrorist violence.

3. The Fall of The Soviet Union

Perhaps more significant in diminishing terrorist activity than Israeli and Western efforts was instead the loss of sponsors for the terrorist groups.

The PLO has enjoyed a close relationship with the USSR for two decades. The Soviets provide the PLO with arms, training, intelligence, and documentation. Prior to 1982 they transferred to the PLO great quantities of weapons, including such things as a battalion of tanks from Hungary; but since the PLO was driven out of Lebanon, Soviet arms transfers have been far more modest. The PLO can also generally count on Soviet support at international meetings and in organizations like the United Nations. In addition, Arafat and his top deputies meet with Soviet officials on a regular basis. It is estimated that Arafat has traveled to the Soviet Union at least twenty- seven times.⁶⁸

The Soviets had longed served as quartermasters to the PLO and to Arab states that had provided the PLO with political and military assistance. According to the PLO's

⁶⁷ Robert Schulzinger, *American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990. pp. 348-355.

⁶⁸ Livingstone, p. 139.

UN representative at the time, Zehdi Terzi, "Our boys go to the Soviet Union. They go for training, for their education; there is no secret about that."⁶⁹

With the demise of the Soviet Union not only has direct support from the USSR to Palestinian terrorist groups vanished, but aid that came to these groups through Soviet supported nations like Syria has also dried up.

4. Policy Shift in the PLO

None of the counter-terrorist actions made during the 1970's and 1980's were very successful overall. However, there has been a significant though not steady decline.

Appeasement and the approach of a final solution to the Palestinian question have been the crucial variables. In 1988 and again with the Declaration of Principles, the PLO and Arafat's party Al-Fatah, renounced terrorism. This was a major step in stopping international terrorism. The PLO had already become more political than militant by 1988 and the advent of the *Intifada*. After 1988, even the clandestine cells of Fatah had more or less given up international terrorism. This did not stop Fatah's more militant wings from using violence to gain power and revenge with the PLO's return from Tunisia to Gaza and the West Bank nor from occasional attacks on Israelis. In 1989, two men from a Fatah cell in Gaza killed an Israeli construction company owner. In 1990, Fatah claimed responsibility for a pipe bomb in Jerusalem. In 1991, Fatah members attempted a small boat amphibious attack on Israel. They missed and landed in Lebanon. In order to salvage the mission, Fatah kidnapped a member of UNIFIL (United Nations Interim

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

Force in Lebanon). They were confronted by the IDF and a Swedish UNIFIL member was killed.⁷⁰ In July of 1992, Fatah and Hamas had a shoot-out leaving one dead and dozens injured.

After 1993, and Oslo, most violence committed by Fatah is now state-sanctioned under Arafat's fourteen police organizations. It is designed to give Arafat some control in order to provide the security that Israel demands. There was one notable exception, in December of 1995, the Black Panthers, a Fatah radical branch, kidnaped two Israeli soldiers. They were later released.

In short, Israel, the United States, and the West have made the Palestinian Authority and Chairman Arafat responsible for the fight against Palestinian terrorism. With a large and growing constabulary, the famed terrorist responsible for a plethora of outrages actions, operations and deaths is now the counter-terrorist responsible for Israel's and the West's security. Perhaps this solution will work.

F. TRANSITION FROM TERRORISM TO CIVIL UNREST

By the late 1980's there was a slowing in acts of terrorism conducted by Palestinian groups, especially activity conducted outside of Israel. There were four reasons for this slowing: Israeli counter-terrorism, the Western responses, the limited resources of the Soviet Union, and the starting of a major policy shift by the PLO. Israeli counter-terrorism, specifically the invasion of Lebanon and the fall of the Soviet Union had the greatest impact.

⁷⁰ Bulta. 755.

Israel fought Palestinian terrorism by bringing vengeance and retribution upon PLO members and groups as well as against Palestinian groups outside the PLO umbrella. Israel engaged in assassination and covert operations aimed at deterrence. In addition, Israel invaded South Lebanon in an attempt at limiting Palestinian Terrorism and PLO activity.

The West responded to Palestinian terrorism by implementing new laws and regulations aimed at limiting airplane hijackings and kidnappings. In addition, the FBI and other groups in Europe created counter-terrorist analysis groups and reaction teams.

The Soviet Union, a major sponsor of Palestinian groups and sponsor of states providing political and military aid was no longer in a position to provide significant resources by the late 1980's. Moreover, the USSR's new relationship with the West with the Glasnost policy did not allow it politically to lend support to "progressive elements."

Perhaps as a consequence of the above mention causes creating a lack of resources and political will the PLO changed its policy with regards to political violence. The PLO moved to focus more on a political solution than a violent one, of course, this lowered the total overall acts of terrorism conducted by Palestinian groups. In 1988, Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly, specially convened in Geneva, to reiterate the new PLO position of "renounc[ing] the use of violence to achieve the PLO's aims, and accept[ing] the idea of Palestinian self-determination in coexistence with Israel."⁷¹

For reasons discussed in the previous chapter, Palestinian terrorism had declined by late the 1980's. However, the primary issues that were the root of the Palestinian-

⁷¹ Hiro, p. 248.

Israel conflict, no homeland for the Palestinians, remained. Inhabitants of the occupied territories were frustrated by a lack of significant achievement with decades of political violence against Israel. In addition it is possible that many inhabitants believed that the new more moderate PLO would not provide a solution to their problems and thus took matter into their own hands: civil unrest, the *Intifada*.

IV. CIVIL UNREST AND THE *INTIFADA*

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section, section A, presents the proximate causes of the *Intifada* and the Israeli response. The next section, section B, describes terrorist activity during the *Intifada*. Section C describes and explains the rise of Islamist terrorist groups like Hamas. The next section, section D, shows the rise of political movements in Israel willing to make a land for peace deal to end both Palestinian political violence as well as the constabulary use of violence by Israel to keep the occupation. The last section, section E, is a comparison between the success that Israel had in ending the guerrilla war and limiting terrorism while not being effective using a similar strategy against the *Intifada*.

A. PROXIMATE CAUSES OF THE *INTIFADA* AND THE ISRAELI RESPONSE

In *Palestinians: The Making of a People* by Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S.

Migdal, a description of the spontaneous uprising's parturition is presented as follows:

On December 8, 1987, an Israeli truck hit two vans carrying Gaza laborers in Jabalya, a refugee camp packed with sixty thousand residents. The crash instantly killed the four of them. Rumor – an essential prelude to any ethnic violence – spread quickly around that the wreck was no accident, but an act of vengeance on the part of an Israeli stabbed to death several days earlier in the Gaza market.⁷²

⁷² Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinians: The Making of a People*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 261.

By the next day, barricades had been built, roads were closed off, and violence against Israeli soldiers and civilians dramatically increased.⁷³ “First with stones, then with Molotov cocktails and finally, in some instances, with guns. It was a popular uprising, and it took even the PLO in Tunis by surprise.”⁷⁴

After the first few months, it became clear that a cohesive national spirit had developed among the Palestinians. They were proud of their achievements under a local, authentic, new, and youthful leadership that forced PLO headquarters in Tunis to coordinate its policies and tactics with those of the intifada in the Occupied Territories. In 1988 Jordan ended all claims to the West Bank, which it had controlled from 1948 to 1967. Thus, PLO leader Yasser Arafat was now recognized as the leader of the Palestinian national cause.⁷⁵

The violence that was manifested during the *Intifada* had two very different faces. There was the soon to become familiar scene of a fourteen year old “child of the stones” lobbing a rock at an Israeli Defense Force soldier in a battle dress uniform holding an Uzi. At the same time, the old guard of professional, foreign-financed, and often foreign based Palestinian terrorist organizations was still active. Israel had to respond to both.

Samih K. Farsoun in *Palestine and the Palestinians* described the impact that the “children of the stones” had on both Israelis and Israel’s Western allies. He writes:

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 262.

⁷⁴ Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History*, (NY, NY: William Morrow and Co., 1998), 525.

⁷⁵ Don Peretz and Gideon Doron, *The Government and Politics of Israel*, 3rd ed., p. 262, Westview Press, 1997.

The Western media that covered the intifada, especially the confrontations between stone-throwing Palestinian youths and the heavily armed Israeli occupation soldiers, captured on film images that were far different from those long held by the Arab-Israel or Palestinian-Israeli conflicts. The old myth of Israel's David facing the Arab Goliath was shattered and actually reversed: Israel now appeared before all the world as the vicious Goliath beating up on the Palestinian David.⁷⁶

It is not surprising that the image described by Farsoun would generate a response from the Israeli public. The more liberal elements in the Israeli polity saw this as an indication that a solution to the Palestinian question must come soon and that violence by the Israelis was not part of that solution. Political movements like Peace-Now embraced the concept that the *Intifada* was the turning point from Israel being oppressed by Palestinian political violence to Israel being the oppressor of the Palestinian people . Prime Minister Rabin, told army officers that if they had "the choice between shooting him with a rifle or striking [a rock-throwing Palestinian] with a club, then it was better to use the club."⁷⁷ The press spun this into "strike with a club... break their bones." The harshness that was sometimes required of an occupying constabulary force caused much soul searching among the Israelis.⁷⁸ Perhaps, the simple truth that if Israel is the oppressor then one could reason that Israeli security was reasonably assured and Israel was now in a position to make a peace deal. This was the logic that many in Israel would adopt.

⁷⁶ Samih K. Farsoun with Christina E. Zacharia, *Palestine and Palestinians*, p. 205, Westview Press, 1997.

⁷⁷ Gilbert, p. 526.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 527.

In *The Armed Dimension of the Intifada* by Anat Kurz the concept that the Israelis are effected by and respond to violence is the key assumption of his essay. He writes:

Our discussion is guided by the assumption that the violent course of the Palestinian struggle influences Israeli public opinion. Thus it played a significant role in consolidating the Israeli-PLO rapprochement, and is likely to influence the direction and pace of the peace process.⁷⁹

The "children of the stones" images and the oppression required of occupation had split Israeli public opinion between a desire for peace and demand for greater force to deal with the violence in the occupied territories. The peace movement gained momentum until the assassination of Rabin by a religious-nationalist maid peace proposals temporarily untenable until Israeli tempers cooled and a new government coalition could be formed . The Peace movement then become dormant for half a decade.

B. TERRORISM DURING THE INTIFADA

While the riots in the territories persisted, other Palestinian organizations engaged in more traditional terrorism modeled on the acts committed in the 1970's and early 1980's. The names of the players and the organizations had not changed much in twenty years. Abu Nidal, the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the PFLP General Command were all still active during the *Intifada*. A new organization based on political Islam rather than nationalism

⁷⁹ Anat Kurz, "The Armed Dimension of the Intifada," *The Middle East Military Balance: 1993-1994*, edited by Shlomo Gazit, p. 111, The Jerusalem Post, 1994.

joined their ranks: Hamas. Another departed -- Fatah and the whole PLO, officially renounced terrorism. Assassinations and revenge, however, still took place.

The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) was responsible over the last three decades for 90 attacks in over 20 countries killing more than 300 and injuring 600.⁸⁰ Though "considerably weakened by the Gulf War, dissipating support from friendly nations, and very successful operations run against it by Israel,"⁸¹ the ANO was significantly active during the time of the *Intifada*. In March of 1988, the ANO attacked an Alitalia airline crew aboard a bus in India. In May, the ANO detonated a car bomb in Cyprus by the Israeli Embassy killing three and wounding 17. Abu Nidal claimed the car bomb as retaliation for the killing of Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad). In the same month, ANO attacked the Acropole Hotel and Sudan Club in Khartoum killing eight and injuring 21.⁸²

In 1989, Abu Nidal liquidated 150 of 300 cadres of the organization. Some of those killed were members of the Libyan intelligence community. This caused a temporary rift between Libyan head of state Colonel Qadaffi and Abu Nidal. In 1991, two days prior to the beginning of the Gulf War, an ANO plant Abu Zeid, a PLO bodyguard, killed Abu Hol and Abu Iyad, both high-ranking PLO members in Tunis. ANO continued to make a number of attacks and attempts on PLO and Fatah members. In 1995, five members were arrested trying to cross into Gaza from Egypt. It was

⁸⁰ Bulta, p. 741.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 738.

understood by the PA that they were trying to assassinate Arafat.⁸³ Almost none of the attacks during this time period committed by the ANO were against Israelis. They were either random attacks on Western allies of Israel or against Palestinian organizations that were more willing to work with Israel. The reaction by Israel predictably was more concern than fear. Other organizations were active closer to Israel's home.

The PFLP "advocated liberation of Palestine only through armed struggle but agreed at [the] 1988 PNC meeting to support efforts to find a political solution to the Palestinian Problem. [They] officially withdrew that support as of 01/92, and now appears recommitted to liberation through armed struggle."⁸⁴ Regardless of PFLP's public statements the organization engaged in a number of attacks on Israel during and after the *Intifada*.

In April of 1989, in a radio address from Damascus, Habash, the founder of the PFLP, vowed to continue attacks "across the border." The following month, PFLP with Hizbollah launched two Katyusha rockets at northern Israel. In August, the PFLP launched more rockets, this time from Jordan. In 1991, the PFLP killed an Israeli transporting Palestinian workers. Days prior to the Madrid peace conference, the PFLP claimed responsibility for an attack on a bus carrying Israeli settlers. The following year, the PFLP ambushed and killed an Israeli convoy killing an IDF soldier. In 1995, the organization claimed responsibility for killing two Israeli hikers.⁸⁵ Unlike the ANO,

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 738-741.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 812.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 814-816.

over the last few years, the PFLP has moved from international terrorism to attacks directly committed against Israelis. This has not gone unnoticed by Israel and marks a disturbing trend others may follow. Israel hopes to nip this in the bud.

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) was also active during the *Intifada*. In May of 1988, the DFLP attempted to assassinate Industry and Trade Minister Ariel Sharon by throwing a Molotov cocktail into his car. The attempt failed.⁸⁶ With the advent of the Oslo Peace Accords and the subsequent Declaration of Principles the PFLP and DFLP joined forces at a conference sponsored by Syria and formed the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF). This organization again fell to power politics and split in 1996.

C. PALESTINIAN ISLAMISTS: *HAMAS*

The *Intifada* was catalyst in forming a new organization willing to engage in violence to achieve a political end. *Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya* or Hamas was established December 12, 1987 and committed to "eliminate the state of Israel and established an Islamic state of Palestine... there is no solution to the Palestinian problem except through jihad."⁸⁷ Hamas operates mostly in the Gaza Strip and, to a lesser extent, the West Bank. The organization is loosely structured, "with some elements working openly through mosques and social service institutions to recruit, raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda; other elements operate clandestinely, advocating

⁸⁶ "Terrorist Group Profiles," pp. 10-12, Air College Press.

⁸⁷ Builta, p. 775.

and using violence.”⁸⁸ Hamas, however, is religious and social instead of nationalistic in nature.

Hamas attacked Israeli civilian and military targets, suspected Palestinian collaborators, and Fatah rivals.⁸⁹ In 1989, Hamas kidnapped and killed two Israeli soldiers. In 1992, a Jewish settler was killed in Gaza. In the same year, in a document called “A National Covenant to Honour to Portent the Human Rights of Palestinians,” Fatah called upon Hamas to end killing fellow Arabs and join Arafat and the new leaders of the *Intifada*.⁹⁰ Later that year, an Israeli soldier was wounded and a Gaza resident killed in a gunfight between Hamas and the IDF. At the end of that same year, marking the anniversary of Hamas, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Group of Hamas killed five Israeli soldiers in Gaza.

In the spring of 1993, Hamas rejected Fatah’s call for a dialogue and dismissed Arafat as “dictatorial.” However, by the fall, perhaps inspired by the deportation of hundreds of Palestinians “Hamas and PLO representatives in Gaza announce an understanding whereby Hamas will focus its attacks on Israel and not attack the Palestinians who support the peace accord.”⁹¹ This, of course, did not go unnoticed by Israel. To bring the message home, Hamas, soon attempted five car bombs and the following month shot and killed a settler and his son in Hebron.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 776.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 782.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 785.

The *Intifada* had consisted of traditional terrorism, Islamist inspired terrorism, and a civil often unarmed uprising. Israel was unable to address each of these attacks with a military or constabulary response. The IDF was unable to provide reasonable response to the “children of the stones” in Gaza without crossing lines that the Israeli public was less and less likely to accept. The Israeli violent response to traditional terrorism had been going on for thirty years yet the Palestinian political violence persisted. The rise of Hamas and Islamist inspired terrorism marked a new threat of terrorists as threatening as the groups that operated in the 1970’s and 1980’s. It became clear to many Israelis that violence was not working against violence. This was also clear to Prime Minister Rabin. With the PLO at its lowest point economically and politically in years, being isolated in Tunis from the *Intifada*, with the violence continuing in the occupied territories and across the green line, and with Israel at an apex in military might and economic stability, it was time for a peace with the Palestinians.

D. THE RISE OF A LAND FOR PEACE MOVEMENT IN ISRAEL

Outraged by the occupation and the state sponsored violence required to keep political violence down in the occupy territories a number of grass roots and issue based movements emerged in Israel.

“The Intifada triggered a proliferation of groups and factions within the peace movement [within Israel]. Some formed as a result of dissatisfaction with Peace Now’s cautious posture, while others claimed they would make a unique contribution within the broader movement.”⁹²

⁹² Modechai Bar-On, *In Pursuit of Peace*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 237.

In January 1988, “Red Line,” an anti-occupation organization made-up of Arabs and Israelis, marched from the Lebanese boarder to Jerusalem. In March, another group, “Ad Kan,” would interact with Palestinians in groups over discussions of the occupation and Israeli violence to keep the *Intifada* under control. This group held a vigil in front of Rabin’s residency. A group of Reform and Conservative Rabbis formed a watch group to give aid to victims of human rights violations: Rabbinic Human Rights Watch.⁹³

“The personal and psychological costs sustained by IDF involvement in the uprising affected Israeli public perceptions of the conflict”⁹⁴. Table 2 shows Israelis' changing attitudes toward the territories according to surveys taken in 1987 and 1989 during the first two years of the *Intifada*.

Public Attitudes Toward Future of Occupied Territories	Left Bloc		Labor (center)		Right Bloc	
	1987	1989	1987	1989	1987	1989
Return All or Most	59.2	75.7	36.2	52.4	10.3	11.7
Return Some	30.9	16.0	43.5	34.6	24.2	24.7
Return None	09.9	08.3	20.3	13.0	65.5	63.6

Table 2: Changes in Attitudes Toward the Territories, 1987 and 1989 (%).⁹⁵

The left bloc in Table 2 includes Israelis who voted for Mapam, Rayz, Shinui, Hadash, and the Progressive List for Peace parties. The right bloc includes Likud, the religious parties, Tehiya, Tzomet, and Moledet. The data in Table 2 shows that there was

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 237-238.

⁹⁴ Peretz, p. 262.

a significant increase in the left and center blocks to return all or most of the occupied territories and a significant decrease in those who thought Israel should return no land.⁹⁶

The far left of the left bloc, that part made-up of the Communist Party, the Progressive List for Peace and the Arab Democratic List defines the *Intifada* as entirely legitimate and it advocates the acceptance of the demands of the leadership of the *Intifada*. This group pressed for negotiations with the PLO over the formation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (in 1988 these ideas were considered radical, today, they are generally the most accepted). The moderate left at the time, the group made-up of Rast and Mapam, agreed with the far left that the *Intifada* was a legitimate struggle for self-determination however they condemned the use of violence.⁹⁷

Women's groups have been one of the most successful civil organizations of any that came to fruition in the occupied territories. It is thus not surprising that their interaction with Israeli groups as well as general frustration among Israeli women over the occupation led to action by Israeli women's organizations. The "women in black" held a vigil every Friday in Jerusalem before the beginning of each Sabbath. Their

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ Nathan Yanai, "The Impact of the Intifada on the Likud Party in the Framework of Israeli Politics 1987-1990," *The Intifada*, p. 299, Florida International University Press, 1991.

slogan was "End the Occupation!"⁹⁸ Other women's groups formed and by the end of 1998, a coalition was formed called "Women for Peace."⁹⁹

In general, these organizations did not have a platform of "end Palestinian violence against us." However, virtually all of them were based on the idea of a need for a resolution for peace. It would seem valid that a call for peace is a call to end violence. It was violence -- both Palestinian political violence as well as the IDF's constabulary response -- that created the consternation and the outrage that motivated these peace protestors.

E. A UNIQUE SOLUTION FOR THE *INTIFADA*

The solutions that Israel was able to use in ending the guerrilla war and in slowing terrorism were similar. In both cases foreign support was diminished and invasion of a neighboring state eliminated a base of operations for the Palestinians.

By the termination of the Palestinian guerrilla war, Israel had eliminated the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula as well as the Golan as place for which Palestinians could launch operations. In addition, Egypt and other Arab nations were no longer willing to support a partisan war thus resources for the guerrilla effort vanished.

In attempting to eliminate Palestinian terrorism, Israel invaded Lebanon. In a similar manner to what the 1967 invasions did to guerrilla operations, the Lebanese

⁹⁸ Modechai Bar-On., p. 241.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

invasion made operations out of Lebanon no longer possible. Moreover, the resources that the terrorist on which relied dried up. In this instance it was not an Israeli invasion, but rather the demise of the Soviet Union that terminated the flow of resource to terrorist groups of to Arab nations supporting the terrorists.

The *Intifada* was deferent. There was no neighbor to invade. Israel was already occupying the territories from where the civil unrest was originating. There was no clear way to repeat what had worked in stopping the first two from of political violence. In addition, the *Intifada* was an internal grass-roots movement that relied heavily on resource found at home. There was no clear supporting nation who could be influenced to stop sending resources. In short: what had worked in ending the guerrilla war and in slowing terrorism could not be repeated to limit or end the *Intifada*. An alternative solution was required. The Oslo Accords were that alternative.

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V. CONCLUSION: POLITICAL VIOLENCE, SECURITY, AND THE PEACE PROCESS

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section, section A, reflects upon the thesis argument in this work that Palestinian political violence was efficacious. The next section, section B, describes the political and historical events that brought about the Oslo Accords. Section C is a summery of recent sightings and events of terrorists and terrorist organizations currently. The last section, section D, is a brief look at the future of the peace process and attempts to answer the question as to way the political violence continues.

A. THE EFFICACIOUSNESS OF PALESTINIAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE

In 1949, half a million or more Palestinians were forced out of Israel. At one point, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir argued that there was no such thing as a Palestinian. Today, the Palestinians have autonomy in a significant portion of the occupied territories and are expected to be an independent country under their own sovereignty in the near future. To what extent was Palestinian political violence responsible for this change in the Israeli response to the Palestinians? This thesis has endeavored to show that Palestinian political violence was a necessary component of Israel's decision to agree to the Oslo accords and subsequent peace process initiative.

From 1948 to 1967, Palestinian groups infiltrated Israel across the borders from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Most of these infiltrations had little to do with a guerrilla war; however, the ones that did caused fear and suffering that led to a

sometimes exaggerated Israeli response. In addition, some infiltrations were sponsored by Arab governments. With the 1967 Arab-Israel war, the desire and will of Arab governments to sponsor the Palestinian guerrilla infiltration ended. The Palestinian partisan war ended with a conventional conflict.

After the 1967 War, Palestinian groups engaged in political violence found terrorism to be the most effective form to influence Western governments, Israeli policy, and to bring world attention to their cause as well as revenge. Israeli counter-terrorism, the Western responses, the limited resources of the Soviet Union, and the starting of a major policy shift by the PLO to pursue a non-violent course greatly limited international terrorism by the end of the 1980's and slowed activity inside Israel. Yet, Palestinian political violence did not end.

Although neither guerrilla war nor terrorism had succeeded in achieving the goal of the creation of a Palestinian state, groups and individuals were still willing to use political violence to attain their goals. Thus a new form of political violence emerged: civil unrest.

The government of Israel attempted to put down the civil unrest of the *Intifada* by using the IDF as a constabulary force in the occupied territories. The violence that this force was required to use to respond to often unarmed minors was beyond the tolerance of many Israelis. By the late 1980's, Israeli security seemed to be assured. The guerrilla war was over, terrorism was down, and Israel seemed to be the persecutor and the Palestinians the victims of the *Intifada*. New political movements and popular sentiment were ready for a land deal. It may seem ironic that it was the deal that the PLO had been

seeking all along: land for security. In reality, Israel *because of* thirty-five years of continued political violence was now ready to give the Palestinians *their* deal. Palestinian political violence was efficacious in obtaining a land for security deal.

B. THE OSLO ACCORDS

Secretly without the knowledge of even the United States, the government of Israel and the PLO entered into talks with Norway as the honest broker. In August, 1993 this talks resulted in an agreement on principles. The formal signing of the Israeli-PLO accord took place in Washington on 13 September at the White House.

In David K. Shipler's book, *Arab and Jew*, he recalls an interview with a member of the Palestinian team at the Oslo Accords. He describes how the official was unable to make any headway with the Israelis on a number of issues. However, when he started to talk about security they began to listen. "We were talking their language," when the Palestinian delegates offered structures that helped provide security from terrorism and civil unrest then the Israelis were ready to negotiate.

In May 1994 the PLO and Israel signed an agreement in Cairo on interim self-rule for the Palestinians in areas of the occupied territories. The Palestinian Authority became responsible for these areas thus official starting a land for security deal.

C. RECENT SIGHTINGS: WHERE ARE THE TERRORISTS CURRENTLY?

For the most part, Palestinian groups that were willing to engage in terrorism and other forms of political violence in the 1960's, 70's, and 80's still exist; yet, most have

foresworn terrorism. Most notable, of course, is the PLO which renounced violence in the 1980's. Today, the PLO is responsible for keeping peace and order in the occupied territories. Chairman Arafat of the PLO is a Nobel Peace Prize Winner for his work in curbing violence and seeking a political solution evidenced in the Oslo Accords and the Memorandum of Understanding. He is also the head of the Palestinian Authority and will most assuredly be the leader of the soon to be realized State of Palestine.

Unlike Chairman Arafat, Abu Nidal has done little to pursue the cause of peace. Recently he is rumored to have moved his headquarters and operations from Libya and Sudan back to Iraq. Interestingly, the conspiracy theorists have suggested that he is again working for Israel or the United States. One Lebanese magazine has reported that the US State Department has secretly hired Abu Nidal to track-down Osama bin-Laden.

Dr. Habash operates out off Syria and Lebanon. For many years he refused to recognize Chairman Arafat's position as spokesman for the Palestinians; however, in the last year he has made his peace with Arafat. With his relationship with Syria, Dr Habash is likely to be involved in activity from Lebanon after an Israeli withdrawal.

D. THE FUTURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS: WHY DOES THE VIOLENCE CONTINUE?

With the new structures in place in the Palestinian Authority there are new winners such as the PLO and Al-Fatah and new losers such as Hamas. Chairman Arafat as the head of the Palestinian Authority is recognized as the voice of the Palestinian people to the world, thus stealing Hamas' thunder. Moreover, Arafat as the head of the

Palestinian governing body as well as interior minister in charge of over a dozen police forces is responsible for Israeli security from Palestinian political violence. This makes Arafat the obstacle, if not the enemy, of Hamas' and other groups' violent factions.

It seems that these other groups have lost this fight. The only possible victory Hamas or any other group could seize from the jaws of defeat would be a complete social revolution. This is unlikely and would be hard to orchestrate with Arafat receiving Israeli and Western support. In addition, it is unlikely that Israel would not respond to such a threat. In fact, it is likely that Jordan and other Arab nations which face internal challenges from Islamist groups would work to stop an Islamic based revolution in Palestine. In short: a significant turnaround of events in favor of Hamas and its ideology is unlikely.

After the Declaration of Principles much of the terrorism ended. However, groups opposed to Oslo still engage in attacks against Israel and Palestinian targets that support the peace process. It is commonly understood and has been argued in this thesis that Israel's primary goal has been and continues to be security. The Palestinian organizations engaged in violence today know this well and hope that their attacks will derail the peace process. Arafat and the PA also know this and use a strong authoritarian hand to stay in power and appease Israel by keeping violence low.

There is perhaps another reason that violence continues reason other than new losers wishing to disrupt the peace process. The deal between the Government of Israel and the PLO was a land for security deal. So far, Israel has only returned some land and the PLO can only provide some security. Chairman Arafat more than any other man in

the territories can control Palestinian political violence; but that does not mean that he can control it one hundred percent. In response to this Israel still has not handed over all the occupied territories to the PA. In short: the land for security deal has been drawn-up but has failed to be completely implemented by either side.

APPENDIX. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242¹⁰⁰

(1967) Adopted unanimously on 22

November 1967. 'The Security Council, expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

I. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

¹⁰⁰ Hiro, p. 332.

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 338¹⁰¹

(October 1973) Adopted by 14 votes to one, with one abstention (China) on 22 October 1973. The Security Council,

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. Calls upon the parties to start immediately after the ceasefire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire, negotiation shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

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